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MEDICAID AT FORTY:
REVISITING STRUCTURE AND MEANING IN A POST-DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT ERA
SARA ROSENBAUM*
INTRODUCTION
Medicaid is a vital program .... Medicaid is a huge program....
Medicaid is in many ways the most direct involvement with the
provision of medical care undertaken by either the federal government
or the states .... In some ways, the Medicaid program has been
phenomenally successful .... Yet Medicaid has come under increasing
fire .... Its cost increases, coupled with persistent budget overruns,
have focused Congressional attention on rising medical prices, on
inefficient program management, and on waste and sometimes deceit..
. . Medicaid has moved from a glittering symbol of the "Great Society"
to a problem to be tackled by the "New Federalism."'
Robert and Rosemary Stevens wrote this passage over thirty years ago, ten
years after Medicaid's 1965 enactment, in the prologue to their landmark Welfare
Medicine in America: A Case Study of Medicaid. By its tenth anniversary,
Medicaid already was considered "huge," accounting for some $9 billion in
federal/state public spending and covering of 23 million persons.2
Three decades later, Medicaid expenditures stood at nearly $300 billion,3
making it the nation's single largest insurer,4 with enrollment ranging from 37.5
million' to 52 million6 children and adults, depending on the source of data used.'
Hirsh Professor and Chair of the Department of Health Policy at The George Washington University
Medical Center's School of Public Health and Health Services. This article is adapted from the author's
Stuart Rome Lecture, delivered at the University of Maryland School of Law on March 10, 2005.
I. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY
OF MEDICAID xv-xvi (1974).
2. Id. at xv.
3. In Fiscal Year 2003, total Medicaid expenditures (state and federal) totaled $266 billion.
URBAN INST. ON BEHALF OF KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, 2003 STATE AND
NATIONAL MEDICAID SPENDING DATA (CMS-64), Table 1: Medicaid Expenditures By Type of Service:
FFY 2003 (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-Expenditures-by-Type-of-Service-
FFY-2003.pdf.
4. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, CHALLENGES FACING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM IN THE 2 1s
CENTURY 19 (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health-cast/uploaded-files/
100803_houseec medicaid.pdf.
5. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME POVERTY AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004 60 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2004pubs/p60-226.pdf. According to the Congressional Budget Office, actual federal expenditures in
FY 2004 stood at $176 billion. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
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Medicaid is the largest source of coverage for children, enrolling one in four. 8
Medicaid covers one-third of all U.S. births and is the principal source of public
funding for family planning services.9 Medicaid covers more than half of all
persons living with AIDS, is the largest source of public funding for mental illness
treatment, and pays for nearly half of all long-term care costs.' 0 Without Medicaid
revenues, the nation would witness the collapse of an already burdened system of
publicly-supported clinics and public hospitals and health systems that serve the
poor, including a substantial number of program beneficiaries. I I  In sum,
Medicaid's role in financing health care for low-income and seriously and
chronically ill and disabled populations makes it an essentlal part of the U.S. health
care landscape.
Medicaid is also the financial platform on which rest many of states' most
important health-related social welfare responsibilities in the case of children and
adults with serious and long-term health care needs, such as children in foster
care, 2 low-income children with educationally-related health conditions who
receive special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 13 and adults with mental retardation, developmental disabilities, and mental
illness who receive other health and supportive services through state programs.
14
FISCAL YEARS 2006 TO 2015, at 52 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index
=6060&sequence=0.
6. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 9 (2005), available
at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334%20 Medicaid%20PrimerFinal%20for/.20posting-3.pdf
[hereinafter KAISER COMM'N] .
7. Experts indicate that the enrollment data varies depending on how persons with multiple
sources of insurance coverage are included in the estimates. Approximately 7 million Medicare
beneficiaries, for example, are poor enough to qualify for additional coverage through Medicaid as dual
enrollees. Id. at 4. Dual enrollment is also found among low-income or seriously ill persons with
private health insurance.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 1.
I I. See COMM. ON CHANGING MARKET, MANAGED CARE, & THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF SAFETY
NET PROVIDERS, INST. OF MED., AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED
21-22 (Marion Ein Lewin & Stuart Altman eds., 2000). Along with public health agencies, the Institute
of Medicine (IOM) identified health centers and public hospitals as part of the "core" safety net because
of their obligation to care for the poor and their significant reliance on Medicaid. Id.
12. See ROB GEEN ET AL., THE URBAN INST., MEDICAID SPENDING ON FOSTER CHILDREN 3
(2005), available at http://www.urban.org./UploadedPDF/311221_medicaidspending.pdf. In FY
2001, an estimated 961,555 Medicaid-enrolled children spent some period of time in foster care. Id. at
2.
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 145 1-52 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) (allotting grants to states for education of
children with disabilities).
14. In 2003, 82% of the 6.9 million Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients qualified for
coverage on the basis of disability as adults or children. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, &
SIAiISTIcS, U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., 2003 SSI ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi-asr/2003/index.html. Approximately 60% had a mental
disorder. Id.
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In times of national crisis emanating from natural or man-made catastrophes,
whether the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center or the
destruction of much of the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina nearly four years later
to the day, the nation has turned to Medicaid to pay for essential health services-
even as policymakers debate the program's future.
15
From a structural viewpoint, Medicaid can be thought of as a logical response
to the nation's market-oriented approach to health care financing and service
delivery. 16 Among industrial democracies, the United States stands alone in relying
on voluntary markets to insure most of the population. 17  Voluntary markets
inevitably exclude persons who are unable to afford the going price or whose
individual characteristics make them unattractive customers. With the cost of
employer-sponsored family coverage hovering at $10,000 in 200418 -among
employers that elect to offer any coverage' 9-private insurance is unaffordable to
millions of people. Millions more find themselves either entirely or substantially
barred from adequate coverage as a result of health problems that affect
companies' willingness to offer coverage at any price.
20
15. As of September 8, 2005, as this article was being finalized, an almost surreal series of
developments was taking place in Washington, D.C. The House of Representatives and the Senate
were poised to consider $10 billion in reductions in Medicaid funding, as well as a series of far-
reaching policy reforms, discussed later in this article. At the same moment, legislation is being
introduced in the House and Senate to expand Medicaid's reach to provide a means of aiding hundreds
of thousands of dislocated persons with no way to finance essential medical care and facing an
unprecedented array of health problems ranging from death as a result of waterborne disease to
profound mental illness associated with the loss of life and home. Temporary Medicaid Disaster Relief
Act of 2005, H.R. 3698, 109th Cong. (2005); Katrina Emergency Relief Act of 2005, S. 1637, 109th
Cong. (2005).
16. For a comprehensive examination of the role of competition in U.S. health care, see FED.
TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarept.pdf.
17. Medicare represents the only source of health insurance in the United States grounded in social
insurance principles. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR
PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 63 (2003).
18. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2004 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/
7148/upload/2004-Employer-Health-Benefits-Survey-Summary-of-Findings.pdf.
19. Between 2001 and 2004, the proportion of employers offering coverage at all declined from
68% to 63%, chiefly as a result of a shrinking rate of coverage in the small employer market. Id.
20. See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How ACCESSIBLE IS HEALTH
INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN LESS THAN PERFECT HEALTH? 31 (2001), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/How-Accessible-is-Individual-Health-Insurance-for-Consumers-
in-Less-Than-Perfect-Health-Executive-Summary-June-2001 .pdf (presenting a series of hypothetical
applicants to insurance brokers around the country and finding that in certain parts of the country, even
relatively healthy applicants with even mild conditions received either outright rejections or less than
clean offers). In its study of the individual market, America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) found that
88% of applicants were offered coverage. CTR. FOR POL'Y RESEARCH, AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE
PLANS, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF AFFORDABILITY, ACCESS
AND BENEFITS 2 (2005), http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/IndividualInsuranceSurveyReport8-26-
2006]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
Medicaid, in short, stands as the nation's central means of compensating for
the lack of a unified, population-based system of health care finance, the
consequence of which is the total or partial exclusion of tens of millions of persons
who tend to be poorer and sicker than the norm. Medicaid is far from perfect, but
it is virtually the only national policy response to multiple problems: nearly 46
million Americans without any coverage; 21 millions more publicly and privately
insured persons who nonetheless are under-insured, low-income, and unhealthy;
22
and the lack of sufficient investment in essential community health services.
Medicaid can be thought of as the escape hatch, the safety valve, or whatever
clich6 one chooses to describe a program that buffers the United States against its
own failure to come to grips with the role of government in health care. How the
health care system would function without Medicaid is a question that can be
answered only at our peril, and yet we seem to have arrived at a moment in time
when the program's future as an elastic means of compensating for system
shortcomings is under an increasing cloud.
This article explores Medicaid on its fortieth anniversary and at a pivotal
moment in its history. Part One describes Medicaid's origins and evolution into a
major force in U.S. health policy. Part Two examines the federal landscape for
Medicaid reform and examines legislative reform proposals under consideration as
of the fall of 2005, as well as parallel efforts to constrain Medicaid growth and
alter the program's essential fabric through the use of federal administrative
powers under section 1115 of the Social Security Act. It also focuses on the state
of Medicaid in the courts. The conclusion provides a brief epilogue enacted by
Congress in 2006 and reflects on Medicaid's future.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF MEDICAID
The Making of a Singular Program: Medicaid's Legislative Roots and Basic
Structure
Codified at Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Medicaid was a legislative
culmination of one of the nation's seemingly endless cycles of national health
2005.pdf. Average offer rates ranged from 95% for applicants under age 18 to 70% for applicants ages
60-64. Id.
21. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 5, at 17.
22. See generally JOHN HOLAHAN & ARUNABH GHOSH, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID &
UNINSURED, DUAL ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
IN 2003 (2UU5), uvaiiubie at hutp:/iwww.kff.org/mcd icaid/upuad/7346%20Dual%20EligibIcs
Enrollment%20and%20 SpendingBeneficiariesFinal revised%207_28.pdf (offering an overview of
Medicaid enrollment and spending trends on dual Medicare/Medicaid enrollees).
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24
reform debates.23 An outgrowth of the earlier Kerr Mills grant-in-aid program,
which assisted states in meeting the health care costs of the elderly poor, Medicaid
reflected Congress's decision to "liberalize and extend ' 25 this system of federal
grants to states for specific health care purposes. Although its 1965 enactment was
overshadowed by the passage of more politically potent Medicare legislation that
same year, Medicaid in two respects represented a fundamental philosophical
breakthrough in its own right: a great broadening of national policy regarding
government's role in financing health care for medically indigent persons and the
codification of the concept of access by the poor to "mainstream" medical care,
through "vendor payments," in lieu of reliance on a patchwork of charity care and
directly-financed public health systems.
26
In the beginning, as is true today, Medicaid rested on a financial base
consisting of a shared federal/state contribution arrangement, 27 with the federal
government as the senior partner.28 As discussed in Part Two, this approach to
financing has turned out to contain deep flaws that have ultimately undermined
Medicaid's operational and political stability, as well as its aspirational goals.
Indeed, today much (but not all) of the battle over Medicaid comes down to the
question of who should bear the financial risks associated with health care
financing for the sickest and poorest members of society, a sign that the
federal/state deal struck forty years ago was simply not sufficiently balanced to
weather extraordinary changes over four decades.
The legislative intent underlying Medicaid was evident on its face: to
"undergird what was traditionally a state-indeed a local-function: taking care of
the medical needs of the poor., 29 But in its essential structure, Medicaid resembled
not a grant program to clinics and hospitals, but instead a "third party payment"
system structured to operate like insurance, paying "participating" health care
professionals and institutions for covered services furnished to enrolled persons.
In this way, government financing attributable to health care for the poor would be
accessible to the private sector as well.
23. For a review of health reform efforts preceding the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, see
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 1, at 5-56 and PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 235-37, 290-95, 335-71 (1983).
24. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 1, at 51-52.
25. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at xvi.
27. Id. at 58.
28. In 2004, the federal government paid for approximately 57% of Medicaid program
expenditures. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID, KEY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID STATISTICS 8 (2005),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Key%20Medicare%20and%2OMedicaid%20Statistics.pdf.
29. JOST, supra note 17, at 162.
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From the beginning, Medicaid's sweep in relation to the more narrowly
conceived Medicare program30  was quickly evident. At least some
contemporaneous analysts recognized Medicaid as the "sleeper" program of 1965,
because of its potential breadth, in view of its scope and comprehensive coverage
structure. 31  For some commentators, the program became the "exemplar of a
national health program of the future," 32 covering large population segments under
a comprehensive scheme of government financing.
33
Over its lifetime, Medicaid has been transformed by an astounding
agglomeration of legislative provisions and interpretive guidelines and rules.34 But
it is possible to scrape away the decades of legal patchwork in the form of a litany
of amendments aimed at addressing pressing problems in health policy-from the
failure of the employer-sponsored market to cover low-income children, pregnant
women, and workers and their families, to the lack of a national childhood
immunization policy, long-term care policy, or means of financing health care for
serious and life-threatening conditions with public health implications. What
emerges is a remarkably elegant and simple law whose provisions illustrate why
Medicaid was able to emerge as such a monumental component of health care
finance.
Medicaid followed the tradition of federal grant-in-aid programs, enacted
pursuant to Congress's spending clause powers, which condition the receipt of
federal funds by states that elect to participate on compliance with a series of
structural and operational conditions of participation. 35 Unlike other grant
programs such as the State Children's Health Insurance Program3 6 or the Title V
Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant,37 Medicaid is structured as an
open-ended legal entitlement for participating states with approved plans. As such,
Medicaid is the single largest source of direct federal revenue transfer to state
30. Medicare and Medicaid were both signed into law in the Social Security Amendments of
1965. However, Medicare was originally drafted to address more limited segments of the population,
types of health care covered, and available payment options. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 1, at 51-
52.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 52.
33. Benjamin Werne, Medicaid: Has National Health Insurance Entered Through the Back
Door?, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 49, 49 (1966).
34. For a comprehensive review of all aspects of the program, the most usable tool is probably the
Commerce Clearing House Medicare and Medicaid Guide. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured publishes voluminous and relatively simple to follow materials on the program. ABOUT
US: KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, http://www.kff.org/about/kcmu.cfm (last
visited Apr. 11, 2006). There is a relatively extensive legal literature on Medicaid, although much of it
addresses the program's jurisprudential aspects rather than its systemic and operational characteristics
and impact.
35. 42 U.S.,. § 1396LuU20).
36. Id. §§ 1397aa-jj.
37. Id. §§ 701-10.
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governments, representing 40% of all federal funds received.38 While these state
plan requirements have grown over the years, it is possible to describe Medicaid's
ground rules relatively succinctly; a comparison of current provisions with the
terms of the original statute indicates that much of its original structure remains
unchanged.39
A right to apply for assistance and receive it. Although Medicaid eligibility
is limited to only certain categories of persons, 40 any individual is entitled to apply
and, if eligible, must be furnished medical assistance with reasonable
promptness. 41  As a result, states cannot queue applicants or refuse to take
applications, an option under non-entitlement programs such as SCHIP.
42
Health care coverage and finance without the constraints of health insurance.
In subtle yet powerful ways, Medicaid represents a total departure from health
insurance coverage design principles. Although Medicaid functions like health
insurance from a vendor payment perspective for purposes of statistical studies of
38. Bipartisan Commission on Medicaid Act of 2005, H.R. 985, 109th Cong. § 2(13) (2005).
39. In this regard, the CCH Medicare/Medicaid Guide is an indispensable guide to the evolution of
each statutory provision.
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005). See generally ANDY SCHNEIDER ET
AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 8-38 (2002)
(identifying twenty-five different categories of eligibility, including pregnant women, children, and the
elderly).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005). The concept of "medical assistance"
has been interpreted by courts to cover both the provision of evidence of coverage (i.e., an actual
insurance card) and provision of covered services. On the latter question, courts are divided on
"reasonable promptness," which has tended to arise in the context of individuals who need long-term
care services. See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 715 (11 th Cir. 1998) (interpreting reasonable
promptness provision as prohibiting the use of long-term waiting lists for intermediate care facilities).
But see Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting prompt assistance to
refer to financial assistance, not actual services).
42. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from
Medicaid to SCHIP, I J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 18 (2004). For a study of SCHIP enrollment waiting
lists, see DONNA COHEN ROSS & LAURA COX, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, OUT
IN THE COLD: ENROLLMENT FREEZES IN SIX STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS
WITHHOLD COVERAGE FROM ELIGIBLE CHILDREN (2003), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Out-in-the-Cold-Enrollment-Freezes-in-Six-State-Children-s-
Health-Insurance-Programs-Withhold-Coverage-from-Eligible-Children.pdf. This is not to say that
states and counties do not try to control Medicaid caseload by limiting or discouraging applications.
Anyone familiar with Medicaid's complex eligibility determination system can attest to long waits,
limited entry points, the use of procedural barriers such as unnecessary written verification
requirements, and other techniques that slow down or discourage persons who seek assistance. The
"slow-walking" of the Medicaid application process is a long-standing issue that has received enormous
attention over the years. See, e.g.. DONNA COHEN ROSS & LAURA COX, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID
& THE UNINSURED, BENEATH THE SURFACE: BARRIERS THREATEN TO SLOW PROGRESS ON EXPANDING
HEALTH COVERAGE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 1, 19 (2004), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/uplaod/Beneath-the-Surface-Barriers-Threaten-to-Slow-Progress-on-
Expanding-Health-Coverage-of-Children-and-Families-pdf.pdf (concluding that simplified enrollment
and renewal procedures have been recently retracted, barring individuals from obtaining coverage,
particularly in SCHIP programs).
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coverage, it bears little resemblance to insurance in terms of its inner workings.
Indeed, Medicaid's coverage rules give it the power to finance significant health
needs left unaddressed by insurance markets. Medicaid is not structured on a
"moral hazard" principle; indeed, the program encourages individuals to apply at
the point of (or even following), in particular, catastrophic costs assoicated with
hospital emergency care, nursing home care, and other services for which
individuals "spend down" to eligibility. 43 Individuals thus can apply at the point of
service, when their health is at its worst and costs are higher; indeed, by law, states
must outstation the application process at certain types of health care providers. 4
Coverage can actually begin up to three months prior to the date of application for
qualified persons. 45 Unlike private health insurance, Medicaid contains no pre-
existing condition exclusions and no waiting periods.46 Medicaid contains no
provision that permits "refusal to offer" or "conditional offer," meaning that any
individual who meets program eligibility rules must be accepted and covered,
regardless of health status.
In sum, the law obligates states to receive and process all applications and to
furnish medical assistance promltly to persons found eligible. Any individual who
meets federal eligibility standards is entitled to coverage regardless of-and
indeed, often because of--disability and illness.
Minimum coverage groups and eligibility standards. All states must cover
certain "mandatory" groups 47 of state residents, which consist of persons identified
by certain personal characteristics and low family income: low-income children
48 4and pregnant women, persons who receive Supplemental Security Income,49
children who receive federal foster care or adoption assistance, 50 and certain other
groups. 51 Furthermore, in determining eligibility for and furnishing medical
43. "Spending down" is the concept that individuals whose incomes would normally disqualify
them from receiving Medicaid services effectively qualify for Medicaid because the amounts in health
care costs that they have already incurred are calculated as deductions from their total incomes.
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 40, at 6.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(55) (2000) (mandating enrollment at places other than Medicaid offices
for certain classes of beneficiaries at federally-qualified health centers and hospitals serving a
disproportionate percentage of publicly insured and low income persons).
45. Id. § 1396a(a)(34).
46. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 42, at 10. A pre-existing condition exclusion is an exclusion
from coverage that "limits or denies benefits for a medical condition that existed before the date of
coverage began." Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., HIPAA Keyword Menu,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaal/phiglncludes/023.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). A waiting
period is "the time between when you sign up with a Medigap insurance company or Medicare health
plan and when the coverage starts." Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., General Glossary,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/glossary/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2000).
48. Id. § 1396a(10)(A)(i)(lll).
49. id. §§ 1381-83f.
50. Id. § 1396a(10)(A)(ii)(VIII).
51. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (identifying mandatory coverage groups).
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assistance, states must adhere to certain "reasonable" budgeting methodologies in
valuing family income and resources. 52 These "reasonable" methodologies include
prohibitions against the "deeming" of income and resources from non-financially
responsible household members, as well as between spouses under certain
circumstances.
53
A minimum, reasonable, and non-discriminatory set of defined benefits.
Participating states must cover a minimum level of "medical assistance" to
program enrollees.54 The term "medical assistance" is defined as "payment of part
55
or all" of the cost of a statutorily-defined list of medical benefits and services,
some of which are required while others are optional.56 States may impose only
limited premium and cost-sharing obligations, and certain populations are
exempted from cost-sharing entirely.57
Coverage under Medicaid is comprehensive. States must operate their
programs consistent with principles of reasonableness, 58  equality, and
comparability in "amount, duration and scope"
59 and medical necessity. 60
Together, these statutory provisions have been interpreted not only as requiring
reasonable standards and decision-making around any particular case, but also
reasonableness in program design, a concept that is completely unknown in
commercial insurance markets, which are free to set arbitrary limits on coverage
unrelated to either fairness and comparability among covered groups or the level of
medical need for care.
61
52. Id. § 1396a(a)(17).
53. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(l 7)(D), 1396a(a)(5 1). States' flexibility to deem income and resources
between spouses is limited. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 40, at 36-37 (providing an explanation
of special "spousal impoverishment" rules for spouses of institutionalized recipients).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§1396a(a)(10)(A)-(C) (2000).
55. Id. §1396d(a).
56. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a). There is no particular rhyme or reason to mandatory versus
optional coverage; for example, prescription drugs are an "optional" service. Id § 1396d(a)(xiii)(12).
As discussed below, in the case of children, all services and benefits falling within the definition of
"medical assistance" are considered required as a result of special coverage rules for individuals under
age twenty-one. Id. §§ 1396d(a)(4)(B), 1396d(r).
57. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(14), 1396(o). Children, pregnant women, and institutionalized patients are
completely exempt, for example, as are emergency care, family planning services, and supplies. Id.
U.S.C. §1396o(a)(2).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(17) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005).
59. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(l0)(B), (C)(i).
60. Id. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title Ill does not regulate the content of private health insurance and that,
therefore, an insurer's stipulated lack of any actuarial evidence to justify severe and discriminatory
limits on coverage of HIV/AIDS and related conditions is not unlawful under the ADA), cert. denied. In
most states, insurance laws are so weak that even with respect to state-regulated coverage arrangements,
laws do little to set reasonable coverage standards or prohibit discrimination against conditions. See
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Interpretive guidelines, published coterminous with Medicaid's enactment
62
and now relegated to history,63 established unsurpassed requirements for
reasonable program design. While some of the passages in these original standards
are remarkably aspirational, the guidelines on coverage live on in the rules today.64
The guidelines set the following conceptual framework for coverage under
Medicaid:
The passage of title XIX marks the beginning of a new era in medical
care for low income families. The potential of this new title can hardly
be over-estimated, as its ultimate goal is the assurance of complete,
continuous, family centered medical care of high quality to persons who
are unable to pay for it themselves. The law aims much higher than the
mere paying of medical bills, and states, in order to achieve its high
purpose, will need to assume responsibility for planning and
establishing systems of high quality medical care, comprehensive scope
and wide in coverage.
65
In a well-balanced program, whether or not the scope of services is
comprehensive, institutional and non-institutional care should be
mutually supportive, allowing the patient to move into the institution
and back to the community according to his medical needs. A variety of
non-institutional services is needed to assure continuity of care. A
system which provides the patient with appropriate care when and
where needed not only promotes quality but is also economical. For
example, to provide physicians' services, but not drugs, is self defeating
and costly in both human and fiscal terms.
66
Under this broad goal, standards of coverage for enumerated medical and
remedial services were to be "sufficient in amount, duration and scope reasonably
to achieve their purpose," 67 and states were prohibited from setting program
limitations "by eliminating certain groups of patients or certain diagnoses from
coverage. ' 68  These concepts of reasonableness, non-discrimination, and
comparability, along with the law's "statewideness" provisions, 69 set the stage for a
RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 142-47 (1997)
(discussing state insurance law and regulation).
62. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUB. ASSISTANCE ADMIN.,
SUPPLEMENT D (1966) [hereinafter HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENT D].
63. In 1981, the Reagan Administration notified the public that the Handbook would no longer
serve as a valid interpretation of the program.
64. 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.230 (a)-(d) (2004).
65. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration,
Supplement D, § D-5140.
66. Id.
67. Id. at § D-5130(l).
68. 1d at §6 D-5140.
69. Under Title XIX, state plans for medical assistance "shall be in effect in all political
subdivisions of the state." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (2000).
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health care financing scheme of unprecedented range and breadth, particularly in
relation to both the commercial market as well as Medicare, whose design
resembled commercial insurance in terms of scope of benefits covered and
underlying principles of coverage. 0 Under these rules, state programs, unlike
private insurers, could select neither their coverage groups nor their geographic
markets.
Free choice of health care providers and equal access to services. With the
exception of certain situations involving the use of managed care arrangements or
competitive purchasing systems, state programs must give eligible beneficiaries
free choice of providers participating in the program.7' States also must permit
participation by all "qualified providers." 72 Furthermore, although states are given
broad latitude in establishing provider qualification standards and payment
structures, states' payment levels must ensure that covered services are at least as
available to beneficiaries as they are to the general population in the geographic
areas in which beneficiaries reside.73 This requirement has come to be referred to
as the "equal access" provision.
74
In sum, in its original structure, and throughout its forty-year history,
Medicaid was designed to run counter to the basic rules of health insurance.
Although the pressure for retrenchment at the federal and state level of government
began shortly after the program's enactment and has never diminished,75
Medicaid's essential design has survived. Indeed, its reach has grown with each
public health crisis, from a collapsing employment-based health insurance system,
to communicable disease threats and acts of terrorism or natural disasters.76
70. See JOST, supra note 17, at 63-64, 162-83 (discussing the historical foundations of health care
entitlements and how their devolution led to the development of health insurance for the poor). For
example, Medicare uses arbitrary limits on coverage (e.g., more limited coverage of mental illness) and
applies a lengthy waiting period to persons whose eligibility is based on their receipt of Social Security
Disability Insurance.
71. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(23) (2000).
72. Id
73. Id. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
74. Id. § 1396a(a), n.222.
75. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 1, at 129.
76. In 2001, following the terror attacks on the World Trade Center, New York instituted a disaster
relief Medicaid program that set aside normal eligibility restrictions and assisted survivors to
widespread acclaim. United Hospital Fund: Disaster Relief Medicaid Fact Sheet (10/01),
http://www.uhfnyc.org/homepage3219/homepage-show.htm?docid = 103951. By September 10, 2005,
four years to the day after the attacks, as the nation was attempting to recover from the loss of hundreds
of Gulf Coast communities, policy makers again turned to Medicaid. In the case of the Bush
Administration, the Medicaid response has been through the issuance of emergency policies, authorized
under §1135(b) of the Social Security Act, and designed to expedite Medicaid coverage to legislation
aimed at broadening the program. See Press Release, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Waiver Under
Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/sswaiver/html. A
full list of the federal agency response can be seen at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
website, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/katrina/. The CMS response focuses on the coordination of out-of-
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It would be a serious mistake, however, to view Medicaid as a monolith of
federal requirements. States have significant discretion over the range of
beneficiary groups and services they cover,77 and an estimated 60% of all state
program expenditures are for optional services and beneficiaries, 80% of which are
expended on services to elderly and disabled persons. 78 Nonetheless, Medicaid is a
program that places great demand on federal and state budgets, because it operates
as an interlocking web of legal entitlements that reflect a balance of interests.
States are entitled to federal contributions for covered medical assistance
expenditures, based on a statutory formula that varies with state wealth.7 9 The
effective quidpro quo for this open-ended financing scheme is an individual legal
entitlement among eligible persons to carefully designed medical assistance and an
entitlement among qualified and participating providers for payment when covered
services are furnished to enrolled persons.
Medicaid's Evolution
A full accounting of the extent to which Medicaid has been restructured over
four decades to respond to pressing social and public health programs would
occupy a book in its own right.80 The evolution of Medicaid's legislative
architecture can be classified as a series of distinct categories of reform, and the
illustrative examples offered below are meant to give a flavor of the nature of
program change.
Expansion of populations eligible for assistance. Perhaps the principal and
best-known program response over the years has been expansion of populations
eligible for assistance on either a mandatory or optional basis. These expansions
read like a litany of social problems. The best known, perhaps, have been a series
of incremental mandatory coverage reforms adding full coverage for "poverty
state coverage for displaced survivors from the stricken states. Federal legislation introduced on
September 8, 2005, would have taken an alternative approach, creating in-state coverage in evacuees'
state of temporary residence and would assure host states complete federal financing for aid furnished
to short term residents. See Temporary Medicaid Disaster Relief Act of 2005, H.R. 3698, 109th Cong.
§3 (2005); Hurricane Katrina Medicaid and SCHIP Relief Act of 2005, S. 1688, 109th Cong. § 3
(2005).
77. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 40, at 5, 59-63.
78. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW OF
"MANDATORY" VS. "OPTIONAL" POPULATIONS AND SERVICES 1, 6 (2005), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ Medicaid-An-Overview-of-Spending-on.pdf.
79. ANNA SOMMERS ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID
ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING BY "MANDATORY" AND "OPTIONAL" ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT
CATEGORIES 1 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-Enrollment-and-
Spending-by-Mandatory-and-Optional-Eligibility-and-Benefit-Categories-Report.pdf.
80. In this regard, the Medicaid Resource Book, supra note 40, offers helpful guidance. Interested
persons also can view a simplie but effective ineract'vc Medicaid ref--, .imeline developed by !he
Kaiser Family Foundation, http://www.kff.org/medicaid/medicaid timeline.cfm (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
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level" children and pregnant women 8' and limited coverage for premiums,
deductibles, and cost-sharing for poverty-level Medicare beneficiaries not eligible
82for full assistance. Expansion options also have been adopted for working
families with children,83  adolescents in foster care who have achieved
independence,8 4 persons with disabilities who are workers, 85 uninsured women
with breast or cervical cancer,86 persons with tuberculosis infections, 87 and persons
with disabilities who would qualify for Medicaid if institutionalized and who
instead receive "home or community-based services. 88 In the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, members of Congress once again turned to Medicaid through the
introduction of legislation to provide Medicaid coverage for thousands of displaced
and impoverished hurricane victims.
8 9
The dynamics of Medicaid eligibility expansion have been the dynamics of
incrementalism; that is, with sometimes pinpoint precision,9 0 optional groups have
81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9401, 100 Stat. 1084,
2050-52 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(111) (2000)).
82. Id. § 9403, 100 Stat. 1084, 2053-56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(3)(E)
(2000)). For purposes of statutory structure, "qualified Medicare beneficiaries" and related categories of
low-income Medicare recipients are not treated as an eligibility category within (a)(10)(A), but rather as
a group of persons that receives mandatory financial support, in order to signify their lack of eligibility
for full "medical assistance." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(1ll), (10)(E) (2000).
83. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, § I 14, 110 Stat. 2105, 2177-80 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1 (2000)).
84. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, § 121(c)(4), 113 Stat. 1822,
1829-30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII) (2000)).
85. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, §
201(a)(2)(A), 113 Stat. 1860, 1892 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVI)
(2000)).
86. Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-354, § 2,
114 Stat. 1381, 1381-1384 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII) (2000)).
87. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13603, 107 Stat. 312, 619-
20 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XII) (2000)).
88. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 411 (K)(17)(B), 102
Stat. 683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § I 396a(a)(I 0)(A)(ii)(VI) (2000)).
89. Temporary Medicaid Disaster Relief Act of 2005, H.R. 3698, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005);
Hurricane Katrina Medicaid and SCHIP Relief Act of 2005, S. 1688, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). For a
history of Medicaid's role in Congress's response to Katrina, see Sara Rosenbaum, U.S. Health Policy
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 295 JAMA 437 (2006).
90. Studying any of the expansions in detail reveals the absurd lengths to which Congress will go
to describe the individuals to be assisted. See, e.g., Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and
Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-354, § 2(a)(2), 114 Stat. 1381 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396a(aa)(1-4)) (providing a highly specific definition of coverage group under the benefit
plan as only covering uninsured women diagnosed with breast or cervical cancer only if their breast or
cervical cancer has been diagnosed through a cancer screening program under the Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300k(a)(1) (2000)). This type of precision can be attributed to several factors: the
desire to control the estimated expansion costs in order to stay within pre-set spending limits that
frequently have no real relationship to an expansion's costs, the lobbying power of certain interests, and
the desire not to "crowd out" private health insurance markets, even when the notion that a robust
private health insurance market exists is laughable. See Jeanne M. Lambrew, Numbers Matter: A Guide
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been added in response to evidence of a lack of insurance and access to health care,
as well as evidence that states would respond with additional coverage were the
federal government to come to the table as a partner. Expansion of coverage for
persons with disabilities can be seen as evidence of an emerging understanding on
the part of federal policymakers of Medicaid's role in achieving the community
integration aims of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Program expansions have
made it possible for persons with disabilities to return to work without the loss of
coverage and have increased the availability of community services to persons at
risk for institutionalization.
9 1
Compensating for Medicare's limitations. Medicare's premium and cost
sharing structure leaves many low income beneficiaries unable to either properly
afford or utilize the coverage to which they are entitled. Medicaid covers millions
of Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes are sufficiently low to make them dually
eligible. Medicaid also pays Medicare premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance for
low-income Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes are too high to qualify for full
coverage.92
In the case of Medicaid for low income Medicare beneficiaries, more than
beneficence is at work. In effect, Congress has used Medicaid to compensate for
Medicare's weaknesses in the areas of coverage limits and premium and cost
sharing structure as applied to low income persons. Indeed, even as Congress
moved to rectify Medicare's coverage limits through enactment of prescription
drug coverage, 3 it simultaneously took the unprecedented step of forcing states to
help pay for the benefit from savings realized as prescription drug coverage for
dual enrollees was shifted from Medicare to Medicaid. 94
Broadening the reach of health care finance through an expansion of
"medical assistance. " Over Medicaid's life, Congress has repeatedly expanded
the definition of "medical assistance" in response to the health care needs of
to Cost and Coverage Estimates in Health Reform Debates, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 446 (2004); Judy
Feder, Crowd-out and the Politics of Health Reform, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 359 (2004).
91. Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Olmstead
at Five: Assessing the Impact 17-21 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/Olmstead-at-Five-Assessing-the-lmpact.pdf.
92. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9403, 100 Stat. 1874,
2053 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§ I 396a(a)(10)(E) (2000)).
93. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 103, 117 Stat. 2066, 2154 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1396u-5(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005))
(establishing special provision related to the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit).
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1935(b)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005). As one might guess, states ardently
oppose this deal as well as the elimination of federal contributions for Medicaid prescription drug
payments for drugs covered under Medicare Part D. Medicaid expansion legislation for Hurricane
Katrina victims introduced in September 2005 would both suspend implementation of the new benefit
nu_ . . nIi_ _ iic I *2<"4 I. .. ... _ . .... I . ... .1 . . ...u, ,.I. U v Uc ~t', U c o Ut . . . .C .1. 1 ~ ,UL U I ill~lt p . 'O-.~tlse %ie
Temporary Medicaid Disaster Relief Act of 2005, H.R. 3698, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Hurricane
Katrina Medicaid and SCHIP Relief Act of 2005, S. 1688, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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distinct sub-populations. Perhaps the single most far-reaching example of this
Congressional response to the health needs of specific subgroups was the addition
in 1967 of early and periodic screening diagnosis and treatment services (EPSDT)
for children under age twenty-one.9 5 This remarkable benefit, which was revised
and further expanded in 1989, consists of a service bundle encompassing broad
preventive health services as well as all forms of coverage recognized under the
federal definition of medical assistance.96 In other words, no form of federally
defined medical assistance is optional for enrolled children, other than those whose
enrollment is based on medically needy spend-down status.
97
Other subsequent coverage reforms, such as coverage of comprehensive and
voluntary family planning services 98 and federally qualified health center
services,99 served explicitly to link Medicaid coverage and financing to critical
health care safety net providers for low income persons. This is particularly true in
the case of federally-qualified health centers, which encompass both federally-
funded community health centers as well as health centers receiving state, local,
and private grant support but meeting federal standards. 00 This use of Medicaid as
an express means of financing publicly-supported clinics also underscores the
extent to which the program's original mainstreaming vision faltered over time and
the use of Medicaid to support public systems quickly re-emerged as a viable-and
in many underserved communities virtually the only-option for health care
delivery.
Additional Medicaid reforms in coverage have extended the program's reach
far into the system of community-based health services for persons with severe and
chronic conditions requiring long-term care. Case management services,' 0'
respiratory care, 0 2 home and community based services
103 and personal care' 04
have become core Medicaid financed services, with no market-based counterpart.
95. Pub. L. 90-248, 81 Stat. 929 (codified as amended at §1396d(a)(4) (2000)).
96. Id.
97. The vast majority of children are eligible as categorically needy individuals who meet pre-set
financial eligibility rules. Sara Rosenbaum, et al., Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The
Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, I J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 22 (2004).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1905(a)(4)(C) (2000).
99. Id. §§ 1396d(a)(2)(B)-(C).
100. Id. § 1396d(l)(2)(B).
101. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13603, 107 Stat. 312,
620-21 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(19) (2000)).
102. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9408, 100 Stat. 1874,
2060-61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(20) (2000)).
103. Id. § 9411, 100 Stat. 1874, 2061 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396n(c)(1)) (2000).
104. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13601, 107 Stat. 312,
612-13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(24) (2000)).
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Shoring up the health care safety net. Medicaid is the source of 33-40% of
the funds required to operate federally-qualified health centers'0 5 and public
hospitals and health systems, °6 as well as nearly two-thirds of publicly financed
family planning services, much of it delivered through publicly supported
clinics. 10 7  Medicaid supports these entities through explicit coverage of their
services (as in the case of "federally qualified health center services"' 0 8), through
broad general coverage rules (as is the case with family planning services and
supplies 0 9), through favorable payment rules in the case of federally qualified
health centers (which receive "cost-related" payments for their services (as
opposed to low, flat fees unrelated to the cost of service delivery"0 ), and through
special supplemental allotments to hospitals serving a disproportionate number of
low income and publicly insured patients."'
In its provisions structured to support the health care safety net through both
coverage and preferred payment rules, Medicaid ironically stands as a testament to
the degree to which its original goal of "mainstream care" has fallen short. To be
sure, hundreds of thousands of private health professionals and health care
institutions participate in Medicaid. Yet the dependence on public services
remains enormous; in 2004 for example, approximately 800 federally assisted
health centers served approximately 10% of all beneficiaries."i 2 Whether the cause
of Medicaid's mainstreaming failure is low provider payment rates, the residential
segregation of the poor, or the general unwillingness of private providers to treat
large numbers of low income and disproportionately minority persons-or some
combination of all three-probably cannot be definitively known. In any event,
Medicaid participation among "mainstream" health care providers and institutions
remains low, and Medicaid revenues for medical and hospital care flow
disproportionately to traditional community health systems serving the poor and
underserved.
105. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & The Uninsured, Economic Stress and
the Health Care Safety Net 1 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Economic-
Stress-and-the-Safety-Net-A-Health-Center-Update.pdf.
106. Marsha Regenstein & Jennifer Huang, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Stresses
to the Safety Net: The Public Hospital Perspective 1 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/Stresses-to-the-Safety-Net.pdf.
107. Rachel Benson Gold et al., Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured & The Alan
Guttmacher Inst, Medicaid: A Critical Source of Support for Family Planning in the United States 5
(2005), available at http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/Medicaid-A-Critical-Source-of-Support-
for-Family-Planning-in-the-United-States-lssue-Brief-UPDATE.pdf.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(24)(B)-(C) (2000).
109. Id. § 1905(a)(4)(C).
!!(. Id § 1 396
11. Id. §1396a(h).
112. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 105, at 2, 4.
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Medicaid's support for the health care safety net appears to be essential to
health care access for low income populations generally. In the absence of special
federal waivers, Medicaid does not provide coverage for non-disabled, working
age adults without children. 13 Furthermore, other than for medical emergencies,
Medicaid is unavailable to undocumented persons or recent legal immigrants., 14
Even in the case of populations who qualify for Medicaid, coverage can fluctuate
wildly with changes in income or as a result of interstate movement, as in the case
of migrant and seasonal farm workers and itinerant laborers, who face major
barriers in a state-based program structured for long-term state residents. 115 A
health care safety net remains essential for all of these persons; in view of the
highly limited nature of other sources of public support, Medicaid payments have
become critical to maintaining the scale of operations that make it possible to keep
these hospitals and clinics functioning.
The managed care transformation of the health care system. The original
Medicaid statute is a reflection of its times, grounded in a notion of fee-for-service
care and free choice of providers. In the wake of the HMO Amendments of
1973,1 16 Congress passed reforms aimed at allowing the development of Medicaid
managed care systems.' 17  In 1981, federal reforms gave states the power to
mandate managed care enrollment under certain circumstances. 18 Fifteen years of
state efforts to broaden use of compulsory managed care arrangements (through
their federal statutory authority as well as special federal demonstration authority
under §1115 of the Social Security Act, discussed at greater length in Part Two)
culminated in the 1997 passage of amendments that further expanded the power to
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000) (listing eligible groups covered by Medicaid).
114. Ross & Cox, supra note 42, at 7.
115. See generally Sara Rosenbaum & Peter Shin, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured,
Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers: Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care (2005), available
at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/7314.cfm. The impact of interstate movement on access to continuous
Medicaid coverage had received little attention until Hurricane Katrina. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services has suggested requiring beneficiaries' home states to remain responsible for
coverage and for payment to out-of-state providers. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, KATRINA WAIVERS, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProg
DemoPGl/07_KatrinaWaivers.asp. Some members of Congress would address portability by requiring
the temporary resident state to issue a temporary in-state card, with the costs of coverage to be
subsidized by the federal government. Temporary Medicaid Disaster Relief Act of 2005, H.R. 3698,
109th Cong., §§ 4, (3)(b)(c) (2005); Katrina Emergency Relief Act of 2005, S. 1637, 109th Cong.
(2005) §§ 104, 103(b)(B)(C) (2005).
116. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e(a) (2000)).
117. For a history of Medicaid and managed care from 1973 through 1995, see ROSENBLATT ET AL.,
supra note 61, at 528-644.
118. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2161 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (2000)).
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compel managed care enrollment."' 9 Medicaid managed care today parallels the
use of network-style insurance coverage found in the employer-sponsored market,
which condition some or all contractual coverage on use of specified provider
networks.1
2 0
Cost containment. Finally it is important to note that cost containment has
received little direct federal legislative attention in Medicaid, a reflection of
policymakers' failure to come to confront health care costs generally and the law's
emphasis on state design and administration. The only real intervention on
Congress's part has been several attempts to limit federal exposure to program
costs. In 1981, Congress enacted temporary reductions in federal contributions to
state expenditures.' In 1996, legislation to essentially "block grant" the program
as part of welfare reform, which would have placed aggregate limits on federal
expenditures and explicitly terminated Medicaid as a federal legal entitlement,
122
narrowly failed only when President Clinton refused to sign a welfare reform bill
containing such provisions.'
23
Over the years, Congress's main response to spiraling Medicaid costs has
paralleled its response to escalating costs in the employer-sponsored market,
generally: reliance on the sponsor (state governments in the case of Medicaid,
employers in the case of employee health benefits) to trim spending. With the
exception of Medicare (where decades of reform generally have failed to head off
financial stress), 124 Congress has done virtually nothing to address the larger cost
drivers in American health care; the preferred option for federal policy making has
been to leave the tough task of cost containment responsibility in the hands of
employers and state agencies, while trying to limit its own financial exposure.
This federal non-response also has included an utter failure to help states weather
Medicaid's costs during economic downturns. 125  Congress has on occasion
stepped in with a temporary increase in federal financial assistance levels, in order
to aid states whose own economies are under such serious stress that they cannot
119. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 489 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1996u-2(a) (2000)). For a thoughtful assessment of Medicaid managed care, see Sidney D.
Watson, Commercialization of Medicaid, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 53 (2001).
120. ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 61, at 552. Of course, a key difference is that unlike their
more affluent counterparts, Medicaid managed care enrollees cannot pay extra to go out-of-network.
As a result, Medicaid managed care systems may offer both a floor and ceiling on health care access.
121. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub L. No. 97-35, § 2161, 95 Stat. 803 (1982).
122. Welfare and Medicaid Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. § 1508(a) (1996). Id. at §
1511 (a)(4)(A).
123. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Kids on the Block, NAT'L J., Feb. 3, 1996, at 247.
124. As of this year, reports continue to surface of dire financial straits for the Medicare program.
Jonathan Weisman, Report Emphasizes Shortfall in Medicare, WASH. POST, March 24, 2005, at A I
(noting a report by two independent trustees that Medicare's financial outlook is "deteriorating
dramaticall'y").
125. John Holahan et al., Which Way For Federalism and Health Policy?, HEALTH AFF. - WEB-
EXCLUSIVE W3-317, W3-324 (July 16, 2003).
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meet their normal expenditure obligations. 126 These federal measures have been
short-lived however, resulting in no long term change in Medicaid's financial
landscape.
Despite its struggles with access and costs, Medicaid has been a remarkably
successful program. Its impact on the health of the poor has been extensively
documented, as has its impact on health care access.
121
As Medicaid's importance grew, and as impact of landmark judicial rulings
related to the individual enforceability of welfare rights began to be felt, 128 the
courts became a central focus of interpretation of Medicaid program requirements.
By the 1970s, states were actively resisting individual legal actions on grounds of
sovereign immunity and the absence of enforcement rights. 29 Early congressional
efforts at this time to clarify state Medicaid participation as a waiver of sovereign
immunity for purposes of monetary relief were subsequently repealed, 30 but the
ability of individuals to secure prospective relief through the private enforcement
of federal statutory rights conferred under the program, through the use of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, was definitively established in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass n.131
Thus, although Medicaid contains no independent federal right of action, as in the
case of other federal laws governing insurance and health benefits such as
Medicare and ERISA, 132 individual enforcement of federal rights under Medicaid
is achieved through the "borrowed" right of action for state violations of federal
rights, which is contained in the Civil War Amendments. 133  As discussed below,
126. KENNETH FINEGOLD ET AL., URBAN INST., SOCIAL PROGRAM SPENDING AND STATE FISCAL
CRISES, 11-21 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310888_OP70.pdf.
127. See, e.g., KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, THE BROOKINGS INST., HEALTH AND THE WAR ON
POVERTY: A TEN-YEAR APPRAISAL 32-25 (1977) (tracing Medicaid's implementation to a decline in
national infant mortality rates through improved access to pregnancy care). For an overview of
Medicaid's impact on health care access, see Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Medicare
and Medicaid, Key Statistics (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/40years.cfm (attributing
improvements in health care access to Medicaid program). Additionally, Medicaid has a significant
impact on women's access to health care. Alina Salganicoff & Roberta Wyn, Access to Care for Low
Income Women: The Impact of Medicaid, 10 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 453,453-67
(1999).
128. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 61, at 422-24.
129. E.g., Boaz Nursing Home Inc. v. Recovery Inns of Am., 266 So. 2d 588 (Ala. 1972) (holding
that garnishee could claim sovereign immunity as agent of state in action for recoupment of Medicaid
funds).
130. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 512-17 (1990).
131. Id. (holding that Congress did not foreclose a private judicial remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
132. See Sara Rosenbaum, George Wash. Univ. Ctr. for Health Servs. & Research Policy, Issue
Brief # 14: An Overview of Legal Developments in Managed Care Case Law and Selected Case Studies
of Legal Developments in State Contracting for Managed Behavioral Health Services 2 (2001), 4
http://www.treatment.org/topics/word/Legalovervwarticle2.doc (describing the legal actions brought by
Medicaid recipients compared to ERISA and Medicare recipients).
133. Eg., U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
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with every ensuing year the Supreme Court and the lower courts seemingly have
raised the bar on federal Medicaid enforcement litigation, and today, the right to
seek individual redress for violation of statutory obligations is increasingly
confined to selected program elements.
A final observation is important before turning to the current policy, political,
and legal climate in which Medicaid labors to survive, and this observation has to
do with program financing. Medicaid's very existence as a bulwark of the
American health care system rests on a financial arrangement whose limits have
become increasingly evident over decades, as states, straining under the cost of
health care, have turned to important ambiguities in the law's federal payment
rules in order to meet their own expenditure obligations. As the federal
government has begun to resolve these federal funding ambiguities in its own
favor, states' already palpable disenchantment with Medicaid has grown
exponentially. Indeed, political ideology regarding entitlements for the poor may
appear to lie at the heart of the latest Medicaid backlash, the current climate simply
cannot be understood without considering the program's underlying financing
dilemma. 134
II. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF MEDICAID REFORM IN 2005
Setting the Stage
By 2004, Medicaid had emerged as a program that, in size and cost, eclipsed
any other single source of coverage (unless one treats as a single category the
thousands of separate employer-sponsored health plans offered by public and
private employers). Its growth in recent years has been particularly striking.
Between 2000 and 2003, Medicaid expenditures increased by one-third, fueled by
a combination of factors: rising health care costs that affected the public and
private sectors alike; the cumulative impact of previous reforms; relatively rapid
growth in enrollment among both elderly and disabled populations; enrollment
growth attributable to the displacement of working-age persons and their families
from private coverage as a result of the economic downturn; and states' use of
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care Rationing in the
Courts: A Comparative Study, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 639, 698 (1998).
134. See Holahan et al., supra note 125, Which Way For Federalism and Health Policy?, HEALTH
AFF.- WEB-EXCLUSIVE, July 16, 2003, at W3-317, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.317vl.pdf (offering an excellent overview of Medicaid's most pressing policy
problems and pointing out the fundamental flaws of the current financing arrangement). Over the 1990-
2000 time period, state per capita Medicaid spending grew by 88% while real state spending net of
inflation increased by only 32%. Id. at W3-323. Medicaid by 2002 accounted for 12% of state budgets,
crowding out other essential investments. Id.
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specific strategies aimed at meeting their state expenditure obligations in order to
maximize federal payments for their health care programs.'
35
Although the rate of spending growth was already showing signs of slowing
by 2004,136 the last factor-state revenue maximization efforts-assumed
increasing importance as a policy justification for program reform in a political
environment poised to curb federal entitlement spending for the poor.' 37  As
previously noted, Medicaid growth rates coincided with a series of reports
identifying state efforts to manipulate Medicaid's state expenditure requirements to
create the appearance of state spending when in fact there was none. 138  This
manipulation had the effect of elevating the federal share of state spending to
levels well above the federal medical assistance percentage rate to which states are
entitled by law.' 39  States achieved this result by using the law's flexibility to
generate the requisite state share of program expenditures first through special
provider contributions rather than through state tax levies, as well as through local
government payments. Medicaid permits states to derive up to 60% of all state
expenditures through local revenues,' 40 a financing structure that harkens back to
the history of indigent health care as a city and county activity.' 4 ' This provision
also underscores the potential for downstreaming Medicaid costs to small units of
government without the economic base to generate financial support for the
program. Had local expenditures involved cash payments from municipalities, the
program probably would have become quickly and obviously unworkable from a
fiscal point of view. The response to this obvious structural problem came to be
135. John Holahan & Arunabh Ghosh, Understanding the Recent Growth in Medicaid Spending,
HEALTH AFF. W5-52 (2005).
136. Id.
137. It is worth noting that tax expenditures related to the exclusion of employer-paid premiums
from the taxable income of working persons fortunate enough to have health insurance exceed federal
Medicaid expenditures. In FY 2004, estimated federal expenditures for Medicaid stood at $172 billion.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2013, at 84
(2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4032/EntireReport WithErrata.pdf. That
year, federal tax losses for employer-sponsored premiums were estimated to surpass $188 billion, and
these losses disproportionately could be attributed to the most affluent wage earners. The highest 14%
of wage earners accounted for more than 26% of all tax expenditures. John Sheils and Randall Haught,
The Cost of Tax Exempt Health Benefits in 2004, HEALTH AFF. - WEB EXCLUSIVE, Feb. 25, 2004, at
W4-106, W4-108 tbl.3, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.106v I.
138. KATHRYN G. ALLEN, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: INTERGOVERNMENTAL
TRANSFERS HAVE FACILITATED STATE FINANCING SCHEMES 1-5 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04574t.pdf
139. The GAO notes that as of 2002, federal contributions to Medicaid in the aggregate represented
57% of total program spending, with variations based on state income. Id. at 3. Often, state "creative
financing arrangements" are due to exploitation of Medicaid's upper payment limit (UPL) regulations.
Id. at 1.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2) (2000).
141. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (providing
a historical perspective of when indigent health care was supported by local communities).
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known as intergovernmental transfers (IGTs), a process that allowed states to
certify the portion of local expenditures on indigent health care attributable to
covered services furnished to Medicaid enrollees by qualified providers. 142 Prior to
1965 of course, the bulk of local spending on indigent health care took the form of
direct investments in health care facilities such as public hospitals and clinics.
143
Thus, the IGT process, while making Medicaid affordable, also incentivized
retention of public facilities, not only in order to preserve public systems capable
of serving all poor persons, but also, as it turned out, to generate revenue for
municipalities and states, which frequently rewarded their institutions with high
paper payments and then siphoned off the funds.1 44 The more Medicaid patients
served, the more revenues public facilities yielded for local budgets that retained
responsibility for the millions of poor persons excluded from the program, not to
mention an obligation to address other local needs.
145
State revenue maximization arrangements not only did not go away over the
years, they grew bolder as the gap between Medicaid costs and state and local
budgets increased. States had attempted various approaches to generating federal
payments beyond the statutory levels to which they were entitled. Factors included
excessive payments to state facilities, extensive use of targeted provider taxes and
donations that were then recycled back to providers, excessive payments under the
Medicaid disproportionate share payment system, and excessive payments to state
mental facilities. 146 Another strategy for generating high federal contributions,
which many states were emboldened to use as the Medicaid financial burden grew,
involved an obscure federal rule known as the Upper Payment Limit (UPL)
Rule. 147 The rule is designed to limit Medicaid payment levels in order to maintain
alignment with Medicare; 48 at the same time, it has historically contained an
exemption for public health care providers and systems operated by local units of
government. 149  Using this exemption, states and counties artificially inflated
142. Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Medicaid Financing Issues: Intergovernmental
Transfers and Fiscal Integrity (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-Financing-lssues-
Intergovernmental-Transfers-and-Fiscal-lntegrity-Fact-Sheet.pd f.
143. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 1.
144. Robert and Rosemary Stevens vividly describe the impact of Medicaid's financing scheme on
the willingness of localities to give up their separate systems with a discussion of New York's use of
federal payments as a windfall to its general fund in great part to help support its "massive public
hospital system." Id. at 98.
145. See generally DAVID ROUSSEAU & ANDY SCHNEIDER, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, CURRENT ISSUES IN MEDICAID FINANCING: AN OVERVIEW OF IGTs, UPLs, AND DSH
(2004), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7071 .cfm.
146. ALLEN, supra note 138, at 4.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. Ironically of course, Medicaid payments lag well behind those made by Medicare in the
case of private health nae providerq a fact that at least in par explains the shortage of private providers
in the program.
149. ALLEN, supra note 138, at 6-7.
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payments to county- and city-owned and operated health care providers such as
nursing homes and hospitals.' 50 As states received federal payments in return for
their combined state and IGT expenditures, they would repay themselves and their
localities.' 5' However, only a portion of the funds would be passed along to the
public facilities, whose budgets generated the IGT and which, in reality, frequently
operated under dire financial shortfalls.' 52  The Laguna Honda case offers an
extravagantly horrible case. The facility, a public nursing home, was used to
return millions of dollars to San Francisco while its 1400 mentally disabled
residents were left to endure terrible conditions. Essentially, local public facilities
were used to launder funds.
Congress attempted to close the UPL loophole in 2000, and CMS further
tightened allowable payment levels to local public facilities in 2002 by
regulation. 153  This strategy of over-payment from local governments violated
federal law in two ways. First, states were able to meet their own expenditure
obligations by putting up less than the required minimum 40% state share and by
downstreaming an excessive obligation onto localities and their health care
systems. 154 Second, this under-expenditure by states effectively boosted federal
medical assistance payment levels above the statutory formula to which states were
entitled. 
55
State manipulation of Medicaid expenditure rules of course is disturbing, not
merely because of the federal payment overage such practices generate, but
because the funds received were in many instances diverted away from struggling
and under-funded public health care systems to other purposes that did not
necessarily have anything to do with health care. But perhaps even more
fundamentally, state revenue maximization efforts serve to underscore what has
been obvious even to a casual observer from the outset: the Medicaid funding
formula has resulted in an unworkable distribution of financial obligations,
devolving too much responsibility to states, whose economies are relatively ill-
equipped to withstand the punishment of rapidly rising health care costs,
particularly in the care of the poorest and sickest persons. 156 States could, in turn,
further devolve their obligations to cities and counties, which ultimately had
nowhere to turn for their obligations but their own struggling health care systems.
150. Id.
151. id. at 5-7.
152. Id. For a truly depressing look at one particularly distressing revenue maximization
arrangement, read the decisions connected with the HHS Office of Civil Rights investigation into the
nursing home. http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/lagunahonda-hosp.pdf (Letter to San
Francisco City Attorney); http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/laguna honda-findlet_aug3.pdf
(Letter to Governor Schwarzenegger).
153. ALLEN, supra note 138, at4.
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. at 10-12.
156. Holahan et al., supra note 125, at W3-33 1.
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Local governments could, of course, close their hospitals and clinics; indeed,
many have done so over the past four decades because of the difficulty of
sustaining health care providers for the poor, even with Medicaid's financial
contributions. 157  But many attempted to maintain their health services, while
simultaneously using their local health care budgets to meet their Medicaid
obligations through the IGT process. In many cases, states employed the special
federal demonstration process under § 1115 of the Social Security Act, which
permits the Secretary to waive federal Medicaid statutory requirements in order to
conduct demonstrations, 58 in order to create Medicaid financing arrangements that
favor public facilities and restrict or steer Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care
systems built on these facilities. The need to shore up large public hospital
systems lies at the heart of some of the nation's most prominent § 1115 Medicaid
reform demonstrations, such as those found in Massachusetts, New York, and
California, which struggled to sustain their public health networks in order to meet
extensive need among low-income publicly insured and uninsured persons.159
In sum, the weak financial base on which Medicaid rests inevitably has led to
enormous problems: an undermining of a central program goal of mainstreaming
as a result of the pressure to save local health care systems in order to maintain
157. See Sarah Webster, Care Suffers, More Die in Wake of Health Cuts; Closings Give Detroit
Poor Few Options, DETROIT NEWS, June 25, 2000, at I A (citing cutbacks in funding as reason for
faltering health care programs for poor and uninsured patients); Laurie Abraham, Summit Tackles
Chicago's Crumbling Health System, THE CHICAGO REPORTER, April 1990 (attributing hospital
closings in poor Chicago communities to low Medicaid rates).
158. For a discussion of section 1115, see Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The
Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 110-17 (1992); Judith M. Rosenberg & David T.
Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 545 (1995); Samantha Artiga & Cindy Mann, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured,
New Directions for Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers: Policy Implications of Recent Waiver Activity
(2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/New-Directions-for-Medicaid-Section- 1115-Waivers-
Policy-lmplications-of-Recent-Waiver-Activity-Policy-Brief.pdf. For an excellent analysis of the
impact of Section 1115 on the basic protections afforded beneficiaries under Medicaid, see Jonathan R.
Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of the Use of 1115 Waivers
to Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (2003).
159. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services does not make these negotiations public, but
persons involved in waiver negotiations in states with large public hospital systems explicitly point to
the need to save public hospital systems as the core issue in waiver negotiations. The most striking
example of the willingness of states to agree to sweeping terms in order to maintain Medicaid
demonstration programs that favor public hospital payments may be the CMS renewal of the California
demonstration during the summer of 2005, which explicitly conditioned the continued waiver on the
state's agreement to force more than a half million Medicaid recipients with severe disabilities into
compulsory managed care arrangements. (CMS did not have to push the state too hard; Governor
Schwarzenegger in fact had sought just such a change as part of his own budget proposals.) The
legislature slowed down the deal in September 2005, finding other funds for the hospitals and in all
likelihood forfeited federal payments as a result, but the demonstration is expected to move forward in
2006. Sara Rosenbaum et a., I he Calitomia Endowment, Achieving "Readiness" in Medi-Cal's
Managed Care Expansion for Persons with Disabilities: Issues and Process (2005),
http://www.calendow.org/reference/publications/pdf/npolicy/TCE0930-2005-AchievingRead.pdf.
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some semblance of access for the uninsured poor; an undermining of federal
confidence in the integrity of state programs; and desperate state unhappiness with
legal health care entitlements for the poor because of their impact on state and
local budgets. All of these problems in turn further served to legitimize the
antipathy toward the program on the part of persons who are simply ideologically
opposed to entitlements for low income persons. The problems associated with
Medicaid financing "scandals" have served to feed Medicaid's image as a bloated
entitlement and a source of seemingly endless financial fraud; this imagery in turn
helped obscure a totally alternative theory, namely, that Medicaid is an essential
program in great need of modernization with respect to whom it covers and how it
is financed. Today half the poor still are ineligible for Medicaid simply because
they do not fall into a federally recognized coverage category. 160 Health services
that should be part of every state's program, such as community living
arrangements for children and adults with physical and mental disabilities, are
frequently sorely lacking. Reforms aimed at supporting states grappling with the
problem of countercyclical need are nowhere in evidence. Despite these shortfalls
in coverage and federal financial support, the legislative proposals that emerged in
2005 all focused on reducing federal payments and permitting states greater
latitude to reduce their programs.
161
The welling opposition to Medicaid-from federal policymakers ardently
opposed to legal entitlements and incensed over the IGT incidents, and from state
policymakers unwilling to continue to support Medicaid without fundamental
changes in the program's financing arrangement-fueled increasingly anti-
Medicaid rhetoric. A Google search combining the terms "Medicaid" and
"unsustainable" turned up 33,700 hits as of September 3, 2005.162 A comparable
search linking "Medicaid" and "scam" turned up 832,000 hits. 163 State governors
160. STAN DORN, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RESEARCH INST., MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR POOR
ADULTS: A POTENTIAL BUILDING BLOCK FOR BIPARTISAN HEALTH REFORM 7 (2004); see AMY
DAVIDOFF ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HEALTH COVERAGE FOR Low-
INCOME ADULTS: ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT IN MEDICAID AND STATE PROGRAMS (2005),
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Health-Coverage-for-Low-Income-Adults-Eligibility-and-
Enrollment-in-Medicaid-and-State-Programs-2002-Policy-Brief.pdf (noting that "adults without
dependent children are generally precluded from Medicaid coverage, unless pregnant or disabled").
161. Temporary expanded Medicaid relief for Hurricane Katrina victims notwithstanding, some
lawmakers were insisting when they returned from August 2005 recess that they could reduce Medicaid
spending even as they extended coverage to those with disaster-related needs. Emily Heil, Moderates
Hold Medicaid Key, CONGRESSDAILYAM, Oct. 18, 2005, available at http://nationaljoumal.com/
members/news/2005/hilloutlook/medicaid.htm.
162. Search conducted by the author. http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=Medicaid+and+
unsustainable&btnG=Google+Search (Sept. 3, 2005).
163. Search conducted by the author. http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr-&q=Medicaid+and
+scam&btnG=Search (Sept. 3, 2005). It should be noted that a Google search of Medicaid and "safety
net" turns up 655,000 hits. http://www.google.com/search?hl-en&lr-&q=Medicaid+and+safety+net
&btnG=Search (Sept. 3, 2005).
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and legislatures, faced with the potential loss of flexibility over how state
expenditures, and thus federal payments, would be calculated as well as the
financial impact of the Medicare "clawback" provisions related to the new Part D
benefit, 164 inevitably sought to shield themselves against financial catastrophe by
calling for a significant rollback in the program.1
65
Visions of Reform
By September 2005, two schools of thought had emerged regarding Medicaid
reform: the first reflected Bush Administration priorities, while the second
mirrored the view of state officials. The two positions bore some similarity, but
they also underscored the fundamental differences that flow from the federalism-
driven political schism that has characterized the program.
The Bush Administration
The essential thrust of the Administration's proposals involved curbing
federal financial support, accompanied by a relaxation of requirements, in
particular where coverage design was concerned. This essential thrust can also be
seen in federal Medicaid demonstrations approved by the Administration officials
acting under the broad powers bestowed by § 1115 of the Social Security Act.
The legislative front. The principal legislative proposals advanced by the
Administration employed a variety of strategies to limit federal exposure to
Medicaid program costs, as well as constrain states in their ability to generate
revenues to support state expenditures that would in turn obligate federal payment.
Thus, for example, the Administration proposed to further limit state authority to
generate Medicaid expenditure revenues through broad-based health care provider
taxes, a common source of financing for indigent health care programs. 66 The
proposal would tighten already existing limits on state taxing authority enacted in
1990.167
The Administration also proposed far reaching reforms aimed at curtailing
state incentives to support safety net providers. This recommendation took the
form of a proposal to disallow state Medicaid payments to public providers. The
164. See discussion infra note 226 and accompanying text.
165. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER NETWORK, Daily Health Policy Report (July 18, 2005),
at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports/rep_hpolicyrecentrep.cfm?dr cat-3&show=yes&dr_
DateTime=07-18-05#31443.
166. On February 8, 2006, President Bush signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which cut state
Medicaid spending through 2011. Peter Baker, Medicaid, Medicare Growth to Slow,- Bush Signs
Republican Spending Bill Citing 'Fiscal Sanity,' WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at A4. Furthermore, one
of the landrnark ERISA cases focuss on whethie ui not ERISA piciRpiS just such u stIC tax. N.Y.
State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(o) (2000).
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immediate impact of this change would have disincentivized money laundering
through public health care systems. 16 On a longer term basis, the proposal, which
received no hearing, could have disincentiviezed state investment in public systems
generally, at least in states in which public support derived purely from these
systems' role in state economies. On the surface the proposal could be viewed as
an effort to avert more Laguna Hondas.169 In the long term, however, the impact of
the proposal could have been the further destabilization of public facilities.
The Administration also proposed to significantly narrow the range of
benefits and services for which public providers (as well as other providers) would
be able to generate federal contributions, especially in the case of seriously and
chronically ill children and adults. The proposal sought to achieve this end
through indirect means, by narrowing the definition of rehabilitation services and
case management services, which are optional for adults and required for children
under EPSDT. 7 ° Federal law defines "case management" as a form of medical
assistance, whose purpose is to assist eligible individuals to obtain necessary
medical, social, educational, and other services, 171 while rehabilitation services
encompass services that assist individuals to regain functioning.' 72  The
Administration proposed to disallow federal medical assistance payments for
rehabilitation and case management services when the service is also an "intrinsic
element" of another program.' 73 This change, if adopted, potentially could lead to
the ultimate withdrawal of large amounts of federal payments to public agencies
and public and private provider systems responsible for the care and management
of Medicaid-enrolled special needs children and adults. In effect, the
Administration's proposal would have withdrawn federal Medicaid funds in the
case of chronically ill children and adults served by multiple federal social welfare
programs with shared missions, even though these other programs have been
structured to rely on Medicaid for the financing of health care services.
Particularly at risk were other programs essential to state social service
infrastructure: child welfare programs; programs that arrange for special education
services for children with educationally related needs under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act; and programs for adults with mental illness, mental
retardation, and developmental disabilities. All of these programs share
Medicaid's mission of case management and rehabilitation where persons with
disabilities are concerned; as a result, the Administration's "mission" definition for
168. Id.
169. See Letter to San Francisco City Attorney, supra note 152.
170. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(r) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005)
171. Id. § 13 9 6n(g)(2).
172. 42 C.F.R. § 440.130(d) (2005).
173. New Freedom Initiative Medicaid Demonstrations Act of 2005 (proposed),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/faca/mc/IMedicaid-Pharmacy Payments.pdf.
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this new payment exclusion potentially would result in a dramatic downturn in
Medicaid's role in social welfare financing. As of August 2005, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), which develops cost estimates for Congress to use when it
deliberates changes in federal tax and spending policies, was unable to develop a
reliable cost estimate for the change because of its ambiguity and magnitude.
Finally, the Administration proposed to place aggregate limits on federal
administrative payments to states in order to eliminate the state entitlement to
assistance in financing Medicaid administration.' 74
None of these proposals was publicly deliberated in Congressional hearings.
Furthermore, nowhere in its proposals did the Administration place its proposals in
the context of the Medicare Modernization Act, which imposes major obligations
on states and requires their financial support for program benefits.
In sum, the central thrust of the Administration's policy recommendations
focused on reducing federal outlays and curbing states' ability to generate federal
Medicaid revenues to support indigent care activities. As has been the case with
past reform proposals offered by the Reagan Administration in 1981 and a
Republican-controlled Congress in 1995, the current Administration effectively
sought the freedom to walk away from-as well as new curbs on states' ability to
rely on-Medicaid.
Section 1115 demonstrations. The Administration's proposals occurred
simultaneously with a strategy of constraining federal cost exposure through the
use of § 1115. The § 1115 process is a longstanding tool for reforming Medicaid. It
was used sporadically during the 1970s and 1980s, but came into vogue under the
Clinton Administration as a means of spurring Medicaid coverage for otherwise
ineligible low income persons 175 and expanding the use of compulsory managed
care systems for families with children prior to 1997, when compulsory
emrollment was authorized as a state plan option. 176 The Bush administration has
made particularly aggressive use of its demonstration authority, using this authority
as well as §1115's budget neutrality requirement to secure deep financial
concessions from states to operate their programs under aggregate funding limits in
order to gain freedom from federal constraints.
177
174. CALIFORNIA HEALTHLINE, Bush Administration Sends Congress Draft Medicaid Reform
Legislation, Aug. 1], 2005, http://www.califomiahealthline.org/index.cfm?Action=dspltem&item
ID=113287.
75. Sara R osenbaum, Health Polf,,Y ... A k4 J 635,639(2t
176. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
177. Artiga & Mann, supra note 158, at 7.
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The States
For their part, the governors, who generally are recognized as the leading
state lawmakers on the subject of Medicaid,' 7 8 adopted a distinctly different
approach to Medicaid reform. Not surprisingly, the governors did not echo the
Administration's recommendations for limitations on either federal Medicaid
payments or state taxing authority to generate state expenditures. States'
legislative proposals called for broad authority to redesign coverage standards for
optional beneficiary categories along with significantly greater use of cost sharing.
Indeed, state officials sought to maintain at least the existing level of federal/state
financial relationship while simultaneously relaxing federal benefit mandates,
coverage standards, and cost-sharing rules.179 In effect, the governors sought the
financial wherewithal to maintain Medicaid but as a program that, for certain
populations, resembled private insurance in design and market thrust, except for
beneficiary subgroups-selected at state option-who in the judgment of states,
merited deeper coverage. The concept of discrimination in coverage design, long a
structural feature of the commercial market, was laid squarely on the table.
The governors' proposal took aim at many of the basic dimensions of
Medicaid described in Part Two, primarily in their application to optional enrolled
beneficiary population groups. For optional populations, the governors call for the
elimination of both comparability and statewideness.' 80 They also sought the
authority to replace the defined benefits that currently comprise Medicaid coverage
with a form of "premium support" that would provide beneficiaries with a
premium for "benchmark" coverage to be defined by the state.181 Rather than
mandated benefits subject to rules of reasonableness and non-discrimination,
coverage would be in the form of "premium support" for a coverage "benchmark"
to be set by the states. 82  For optional populations, required comprehensive
benefits such as EPSDT would be eliminated in favor of a premium support
approach. In other words, persons other than those for whom coverage is
mandatory would have seen a defined benefit with modest cost sharing replaced by
a premium support system. In the case of mandatory coverage groups, furthermore,
the governors called for flexibility to use this same premium support approach for
benefits considered "optional.' 83
Finally, the governors also sought "judicial reform," stating as follows:
178. While the National Conference of State Legislatures also has an articulated Medicaid position,
it is the NGA which is typically seen as the major negotiator of state policy in Washington.
179. NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N, SHORT-RUN MEDICAID REFORM 4 (2005),
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0508MEDICAIDREFORM.PDF (articulating the NGA's Medicaid
reform position).
180. Id. at 6.
181. Id. at 7.
182. Id.
183. Id.
2006]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
The right of states to locally manage the optional Medicaid categories is
clearly defined in policy and law, and the federal government should
remove legal barriers that impede this fundamental management tool.
Also, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services officials should
have to stand by states when one of their [§ 1115] waivers or state plans
is questioned in the judicial system and should work with states to
define for the judiciary system that any state has a fundamental right to
make basic operating decisions about optional categories of the
184
program.
This passage effectively demanded a diminution of benefit and coverage
rights not only as a means of controlling program costs but also as a deeper
strategy for shielding states from enforcement actions. In addition, the governors
implicitly endorsed legislation introduced in the 109th Congress by Tennessee
Senator Lamar Alexander, whose state has been embroiled in Medicaid
enforcement litigation for years as a result of a controversial Section 1115
demonstration known as Tenncare. 185 The Lamar bill proposed to curb the power
of federal courts to enter and maintain consent decrees in federal rights
litigation.1 86 In sum, the governors sought both design flexibility and a statutory
restructuring that would ultimately shield states against judicial enforcement of
coverage rights.
In the context of enforceability, it would appear that the judiciary is rapidly
moving away from Medicaid enforceability rights on its own. The decades-long
judicial "backstory" to Medicaid has, over a number of years, grown increasingly
attenuated as a result of an progressively more restrictive interpretation by the
courts of which provisions of Medicaid enforceable rights. Following its landmark
decisions in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, which clarified the
applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to federal actions to enforce Medicaid rights,' 87
the Court has grown increasingly hardened in the tests that it imposes in measuring
when a right may be said to exist. 188 As the mountains that private litigants have
184. Id. at 9.
185. The program's constant turmoil was intensified in 2004 when Governor Bredesen called for
the elimination of over 300,000 enrollees and a dramatic curtailment of coverage, including the use of a
medical necessity definition that effectively leaves the state free to deny any coverage for which no
"scientific" evidence of efficacy exists. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 40, at 61-62.
186. This legislation would put term limits on federal court consent decrees and cause them to be
more narrowly drawn, thereby putting Medicaid issues back in the hands of state officials. Federal
Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2005) (finding that "consent decrees should
be structured to give due deference to the policy judgments of State and local officials as to how to obey
the law").
187. 496 U.S. 498, at 513 (holding that there is a binding obligation on states to adopt "reasonable
and adequate rates," enlorceable by health care providers under 42 U.S.C. § i983).
188. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) (limiting the circumstances under which a §
1983 action may be brought to those where statute explicitly creates such a right); see Sanchez v.
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had to scale have grown ever higher, the lower courts have, with growing
frequency, concluded that key elements of the Medicaid statute previously
considered privately enforceable no longer meet the current test.
In August 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled in Sanchez v. Johnson,189 that certain private litigants could not enforce the
Medicaid "equal access" provision. In its ruling, the court not only reviewed the
similar evolution of equal access litigation in other circuits, but also surveyed
enforceability generally in the wake of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Gonzaga University v. Doe'90 and concluded that Wilder could perhaps best be
thought of as an "aberration" in the line of decisions dealing with services and
benefits conferred under federal spending clause statutes. 191 Thus, the governors'
demand for a fundamental redefinition of coverage rights coincided with a shifting
judicial landscape.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
Signed into law in February 2006,92 the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005'93
(DRA) marks a new chapter in the life of the Medicaid program by introducing
certain fundamental changes into program design; these changes in turn hold the
potential for a far-reaching re-formulation of the rules of coverage and state plan
administration and, as a result, legal duties and rights. The Medicaid amendments
achieve over $28 billion in estimated 10-year net savings.' 94 Although this figure
is modest from a financial viewpoint when compared to projected Medicaid
outlays of $3 trillion over the 2007-2016 time period, 195 the legal changes that
contribute to these savings carry implications that extend beyond the types of
effects that financial savings alone might have produced. Indeed, the DRA presents
Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1056-62 (9th Cir. 2005) (documenting the evolution of the § 1983 legal
theory).
189. 416 F.3d at 1056-62.
190. 536 U.S. at 273.
191. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1056-62.
192. The budget reconciliation measure reported by the Finance Committee and passed by the
Senate contained modest changes in Medicaid and SCHIP, with savings of slightly more than $4 billion
over five years. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATED BUDGETARY IMPACT OF S. 1932, THE DEFICIT
OMNIBUS RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2005, available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=
6886&sequence=0. Required savings under reconciliation instructions related to the FY 2006 budget
would instead have been achieved through Medicare reductions aimed at Medicare Advantage plans
(managed care plans participating in Medicare) as well as other changes related to provider payments.
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, S. 1932, 109th Cong. (2005).
193. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
194. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, S. 1932, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005 36, t. 15
(2006) [hereinafter CBO COST ESTIMATE], available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?
index=7028&sequence=0.
195. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2007-2016, t. 3.3 (2006),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=7027&sequence=O.
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one of those legislative situations in which dollar calculations do an injustice to the
nature of the financial reform under consideration; ironically, in fact, certain
amendments that on their face appear to be the most far-reaching also carry CBO
cost-estimates that would seem absurdly low on their face. 196 To illustrate how
dollar savings can be misleading, consider that Congress could have achieved the
same 10-year savings by simply enacting a fractional reduction in federal
contribution levels to state Medicaid programs over a 10-year time period. Such
an approach, identical to one taken in 1981,197 could have produced the requisite
financial contribution to deficit reduction without altering program structure. But
twenty-five years later, in an age of dramatically altered public policy visions
regarding the role of government in the lives of the poor and medically vulnerable,
such an approach would have been philosophically and politically unthinkable.
The DRA reforms were the result of a bitter legislative battle over the future
of Medicaid. The fight began with a battle over whether to include any Medicaid
savings at all into the FY 2006 federal budget blueprint or instead defer to a
Congressionally appointed commission (the cuts were included, the commission
was not).1 98 The battle continued with a decision by the administration to appoint a
commission of its own, headed by HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt, whose
recommendations,' 99 along with those offered by the nation's governors,2 0 0
included calls for significant reforms in coverage and cost sharing (the governors'
recommendations actually surpassed those offered by the Medicaid Commission).
The fight culminated with enactment of the DRA, which was controversial
196. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that changes related to citizenship
proof changes would save $735 million over 10 years and result in the removal of only about 35,000
persons. Id. An estimate by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities however, which is based on
actual data gleaned from a telephone survey of beneficiaries, concluded that the changes would lead to
the elimination of as many as 5 million children and adults who lack citizenship proof.
197. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97- 35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 357. The
reductions were repealed three years later.
198. Revising the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006, H.R. Con. Res. 214,
109th Cong. (2005).
199. The Medicaid Commission, popularly known as the Leavitt Commission, resulted from
Congressional Medicaid budget negotiations as part of the first Budget Resolution for FY 2006. THE
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER NETWORK, Daily Health Policy Report (May 23, 2005),
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports/repindex.cfm?hint=3&DRID=30259. The Commission
had controversial roots, formed by HHS after the Senate's efforts to delay any Medicaid cuts until a
Congressionally appointed commission had studied the program and reported to Congress was rebuffed
in conference. Id. The Commission released a report on September 2, 2005, calling for certain
changes in beneficiary cost sharing, nursing home asset transfer policies, and prescription drug pricing.
As of March 16, 2006, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had relocated the report to an
undisclosed website location. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/faca/mc/090105rpt.pdf. A summary of the
report can be viewed at THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER NETWORK, Daily Health Policy Report
(Sept. 2, 2005), http://www.kaisemetwork.org/daily reports/repindex.cfm?hint=3&DRID= 32380.
200. The NGA position statement on Medicaid can be found at
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.8358ec82f5bI98dI 8a27811050101OaO/?vgnextoid=e5ff0
640e8e3401OVgnVCMIOOOOOaOIOIOaRCRD (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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virtually in its entirety,2°  and whose enactment spilled over into 2006. With
respect to Medicaid, the final legislation goes well beyond changes recommended
by either the governors or the commission.
A full examination of the Medicaid provisions in the DRA is beyond the
scope of this article; indeed, many may prove to be subject matter for lengthy
articles in their own right. The focus here instead is on provisions that directly
reduce eligibility as well as the nature, structure, and extent of coverage among
eligible and enrolled persons. Several important amendments are excluded:
expanded state options to liberalize eligibility and/or coverage rules for certain
children and adults with disabilities,20 2 revision in payment methods for the
outpatient prescription drugs, 20 3 limitations and exclusions on federal payments to
states for certain administration and medical assistance services for children and
adults with special health care needs (especially children in foster care
placements),20 4 changes in federal standards governing the prevention of fraud and
abuse2 0 5 "Health Opportunity Account" reforms to encourage state demonstrations
\ establishing "health savings account"-type insurance for Medicaid beneficiaries
comprised of high deductible plans linked to health savings accounts,20 6 and other
amendments related to federal funding and state program administration.
20 7
Many of these statutory changes carry substantial cost estimates (for example,
the prescription drug amendments alone account for more than $12.5 billion of the
net 10-year savings).208  But it is the reductions directly affecting eligibility and
coverage that proved to be the most controversial and that carry the most
immediate and powerful implications for affected beneficiaries. Indeed, the DRA
achieves nearly $11 billion of total net estimated Medicaid 10-year savings-more
than a third of the total-through changes explicitly aimed at removing individuals
from the rolls or reducing benefits and coverage.2 09 Yet even as the ramifications
of some of the most legally significant provisions become clearer, the Act's
provisions aimed at program performance for children and adults with severe
201. Robert Pear, Domestic Spending Squeezed Throughout the Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2006, at A14.
202. DRA §§ 6062-71.
203. Id. §§ 6001-63.
204. Id. § 6052.
205. Id. § 6034.
206. Id. § 6082.
207. Id. §§ 6001-202 represent all amendments to Medicaid, including both changes to the statute as
well as "outside the quotes" revisions to Medicaid operations at the federal level. An example of such
"outside the quotes" changes that affect federal Medicaid operations but do not make permanent
changes in the statute is Subtitle C of Title VI, related to special Medicaid payments to locales affected
by Hurricane Katrina. For a discussion of Medicaid policy and Hurricane Katrina, see Sara
Rosenbaum, U.S. Health Policy in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 295 JAMA 437 (2006).
208. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 194, at t. 15.
209. Id.
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disabilities offer at least a faint outline of an emerging consensus regarding
Medicaid's structural importance in developing and supporting community-based
systems of care for persons with disabilities.
Reductions in eligibility
Written proof of citizenship
Medicaid eligibility hinges a series of criteria, one of which is citizenship or
legal residency satisfying a minimum durational test.21 ° Prior to the DRA, federal
law required no written proof of citizenship at the time of application or
redetermination, although legal residents were required to submit written proof of
legal status.21' Citizenship was verified simply through oral affirmation.
The DRA modifies current law by requiring individuals seeking Medicaid
coverage to furnish written proof of citizenship in the case of individuals other than
dual Medicare/Medicaid enrollees, recipients of Supplemental Security Income,
and others granted an exemption by the Secretary. 212 At least one analysis based
on actual interviews with beneficiaries concludes that this change alone will result
in an estimated loss of between 3 and 5 million children and adults because of a
pervasive lack of written documentation of citizenship and a financial inability to
secure required proof. It is not possible to know whether states will cover the cost
of securing documentation as a program administration cost or even whether the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will permit it. The citizenship
requirements take effect for calendar quarters beginning on July 1, 2006, and the
requirements are applicable at both the initial eligibility determination and
redetermination stages.213  Thus, rather than being applied on a going-forward
basis, the new proof requirement applies to current beneficiaries as they reach their
date of eligibility redetermination for continued assistance. 214  In recent years,
states have attempted to streamline the application, eligibility determination, and
redetermination processes by reducing paperwork submission requirements and
permitting "passive redetermination" for certain population groups (i.e.,
210. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, STATE MEDICAID MANUAL §§ 3210-3256,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2006). Otherwise eligible
undocumented persons and legal residents who entered the country within the past seven years are
eligible for emergency coverage only. For an excellent overview of Medicaid eligibility, see
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 40, at Ch. 1.
211. LEIGHTON KU ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, SURVEY INDICATES BUDGET
RECONCILIATION BILL JEOPARDIZES MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR 3 TO 5 MILLION U.S. CITIZENS (Feb.
17, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/I -26-06health.pdf.
212. DRA § 6037 (to amend 42 U.S.C. §1396b).
213. Id. § 6036 (to amend section 1903 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(i)).
214. Medicaid eligibility is both need-based and tied to the ability to satisfy certain categorical
status attributes (e.g., pregnancy, disability). As a result, states are required to periodically redetermine
eligibility, at least every twelve months. 42 C.F.R. § 435.916.
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continuation of enrollment upon affirmation that no changes have occurred).215
The citizenship proof requirements would appear to have an enormous impact on
such systems.
Expanded eligibility prohibitions linked to asset transfers
Prior to the DRA, federal Medicaid law provided for the disqualification of
individuals who transferred assets for less than fair market value; the period of
disqualification could be as long as thirty-six months and commenced on the date
of the asset transfer. 216 The disqualification applied primarily to elderly persons
who transferred assets (or, more accurately probably, to people whose adult
relatives relieved them of their assets) for less than fair market value in order to
qualify for long term care assistance, either in institutions or in community settings
under so-called "home and community based care waivers.217 Studies of elderly
persons at risk for long term care suggest that few in fact possess assets of any
significant value, 2 is although one of the more commonly told fables in Washington
Medicaid policy circles is a tale of millionaires who give away their property in
219
order to qualify for Medicaid-financed long term care.
The DRA makes numerous changes in asset valuation and penalty rules as
well as in methodologies for calculating penalty periods. Most significantly
perhaps, the legislation lengthens the period of disqualification to sixty months, a
change that by itself is serious but perhaps not profoundly worse in terms of "real-
world" impact than the already-existing thirty-six-month disqualification period.
In addition however, the DRA re-classifies the period of disqualification as
commencing either from the date of the transfer or from the date on which
eligibility otherwise would begin, whichever occurs later.22 0 Thus, an individual
whose assets were transferred sixty-five months prior to the date of application
(and thus outside of the new, lengthened transfer window) nonetheless still would
215. For a discussion of enrollment simplification, see DONNA COHEN Ross AND LAURA COX,
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MAKING IT SIMPLE (2000), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2191 -index.cfm.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (discussed in CCH Medicare/Medicaid Guide, 14,311).
217. Id.
218. Evidence regarding the limited number of individuals with significant assets to transfer
holdings to qualify for Medicaid can be found in KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
FRONTLINE PERSPECTIVES ON LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING DECISIONS AND MEDICAID ASSETS (Feb.
2006) [hereinafter FRONTLINE PERSPECTIVES], http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7458.cfm.
219. Anyone who has spent any amount of time in a Medicaid-participating long term care facility
(many of the best facilities do not participate in Medicaid or severely limit their participation to
individuals who converted from private pay patients) quickly would know just how apocryphal such a
story is. But there was just enough anecdotal evidence of Medicaid's use as an estate planning device
to lend credibility to the claims and to support legislation carrying severe penalties. See the discussion
of estate planning and Medicaid in FRONTLINE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 218.
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) & 1396p(c)(1)(D) (as amended by DRA §6011).
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face a period of exclusion commencing on the date of eligibility. The DRA places
the burden of proof on the individual to demonstrate a level of "hardship '22I
sufficient to overcome the disqualification period.
Reductions in coverage and out-of-pocket payment protections
"Benchmark" coverage
In what may be the most far-reaching change from a structural and legal
perspective, the DRA gives states the option to alter the definition of medical
assistance for certain population groups, specifically low income children and their
parents.222 The legislation adds a new section to the Medicaid statute, which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
Sec. 1937. (a) STATE OPTION OF PROVIDING BENCHMARK
BENEFITS.-
(I) AUTHORITY.-
(A) IN GENERAL.- Notwithstanding any other provision of this title,
a State, at its option as a State plan amendment, may provide for
medical assistance under this title to individuals specified by the State
through enrollment in coverage that provides-
(i) benchmark coverage.., or benchmark equivalent coverage... ; and
(ii) for any child under 19 years of age who is covered under the State
plan . . . , wrap-around benefits to the benchmark coverage or
benchmark equivalent coverage consisting of early and periodic
screening, diagnostic, and treatment services defined in section
1905(r).223
Translated into understandable terms, this section authorizes, for affected
children and adults, a shift from the "defined benefit" approach to coverage that
historically has characterized Medicaid to a "defined contribution" system under
which a state program would pay premium support for a coverage product, with
almost no specifications regarding the terms of coverage. Significantly, this new
flexibility in coverage design applies to currently eligible populations but not to
new populations whom states might add to their state plans, although at a reduced
level of coverage. 224 In other words, states can use their new flexibility to reduce,
but not expand, coverage.
221. Id.
222. §1937(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (as added by §6044 of the DRA).
223. § 1937 (a)() of the Social Security Act (as added by § 6044 of the DRA).
224. §1937(a)(1)(B) of the Social Security Act (as added by §6044 of the DRA).
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The shift in benefit design has the potential to affect not only the structure of
Medicaid but the nature of the entitlement itself. Under a defined benefit
approach, the entitlement consists of an entitlement to coverage encompassing a
broad array of specified benefits; indeed, the detailed nature of benefit
specification is such that much of the Medicaid litigation that has taken place over
the past four decades has focused on the enforcement of federal coverage rights in
terms of benefit class and amount, duration, and scope.
225
A premium support approach, on the other hand, entitles individuals to, at
most, a defined contribution toward health coverage, with almost total discretion
over actual benefit design left to insurer discretion rather than legally enforceable
standards; under this approach, legal provisions related to enumerated benefits and
tests of reasonableness would no longer apply. The Medicare Part D outpatient
prescription drug program represents a version of this defined contribution,
premium support approach to coverage, entitling eligible persons to subsidized
enrollment in plans rather than defined drug benefits. 226
The DRA applies this approach to Medicaid, permitting states as a matter of
routine program design and administration to eliminate specific coverage rights for
certain classes of beneficiaries, specifically low income children and their parents.
For these two populations states could substitute a contribution toward coverage
meeting "benchmark" or "benchmark equivalency" standards. 227  Benchmark
equivalency, which represents the coverage floor under the law, consists in its
entirety of inpatient and outpatient hospital services, physicians' surgical and
medical services, laboratory and x-ray services, and "well-baby and well-child"
care (undefined), including age-appropriate immunizations. 228 This standard is
identical to that used in the State Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 229 program,
which furnishes premium support assistance to certain low income but Medicaid-
ineligible children.
2 30
The one notable limitation on coverage discretion in benchmark states is the
requirement that benchmark states furnish children under nineteen with enrollment
in coverage that "provides for wrap-around benefits to the benchmark coverage or
benchmark equivalent coverage consisting of early and periodic screening,
diagnostic, and treatment services defined in section 1905(r)." Legislative history
concurrent to final passage, including the conference agreement,2 31 CBO cost
estimates accompanying the final legislation 232 and statements issued by the
225. See Jost, supra note 17, at 32; ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 61, at 410-66.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 1860D-I(a) (2000).
227. Id. § 1937(a)(1).
228. Id. § 1937(b)(2) (as added by § 6044 of the DRA).
229. 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(a) (2000).
230. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 42, 1-47.
231. H.R. Rep. No. 109-362 (2005).
232. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 194.
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Administration 233 and Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
(which has jurisdiction over Medicaid) 234 indicate that Congress intended to
preserve EPSDT coverage, at least for children under nineteen. But the legislative
language that describes what might be characterized as an EPSDT "savings clause"
is vague, and therefore, the risk of state confusion over the extent of children's
rights and states' duties, is extremely high.2 35 The provision offers no definition of
"wrap-around" (a term that never before appeared in the context of ESPDT law),
and offers no direction regarding how the broad language of the benchmark is to be
reconciled with EPSDT coverage rights. Whether courts can navigate the morass
of this example of legislative drafting at its absolute worst is not clear.
The ambiguities over the EPSDT savings clause are further complicated by
the opening clause of §1937 itself, which provides that its terms apply
"notwithstanding any other provision of this title." Such breathtakingly broad
language never has been used to introduce an amendment into this notoriously
complex law. Whether courts will interpret the language as permitting benchmark
states to disregard all aspects of the statute-including the legal right to coverage
itself among eligible persons -36-remains to be seen. Nothing in either the
benchmark section or its history suggests that Congress intended to supersede any
provision of law other than those that pertain directly to the definition of medical
assistance, but the highly textual approach taken by the United States Supreme
Court in recent years to the interpretation of Spending Clause statutes alleged to
create legal rights leaves the future of the Medicaid entitlement in benchmark
states uncertain.
2 37
Although the legal outcome of the benchmark amendment is uncertain, its
practical effects are not. Table I compares the federal EPSDT benefit against a
legally acceptable "benchmark) (in this case, an insurance plan offered to federal
employees) and illustrates the potential magnitude of coverage loss for children if
state benchmark systems fail to effectively ensure children access to both
"benchmark coverage" and EPSDT.
233. Letter from Dr. Mark B. McClellan, CMS Administrator, to the U.S. Senate, Dec. 19, 2005.
234. Statement by Rep. Joe Barton, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, June
15, 2005, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/06152005hearing1550/The_
Honorable JoeBarton.htm.
235. The risk may be heightened by the fact that the governors in their 2005 position statements
recommended elimination of EPSDT rights for some or most children, and the benchmark provision
itself alludes to "well-baby and well-child" care. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N , supra note 179, at 7.
236. Courts continue to find a legal entitlement to coverage as defined in § 1902(a)(10) of the
Social Security Act even as they find numerous other provisions of the statute non-enforceable. See,
e.g., Saiincz v Joisuin, 415 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9di Cir., 2005), Watsoii v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1157
(9th Cir. 2006).
237. Gonzaga v Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-91 (2002).
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Table 1. A Comparison of EPSDT and the FEHBP Standard PPO
BENEFIT MEDICAID EPSDT FEHBP STANDARD PPO
PROGRAM OPTION BLUE CROSS/BLUE
SHIELD PLAN
Comprehensive assessment Covered Limited to "healthy newborn
of physical and mental visits," "routine screening,"
growth and development "routine physical examinations,"
(developmental "neurological testing," and initial
assessments) examination of a newborn needing
"definitive treatment," when the
infant is covered under a family
enrollment.
Anticipatory guidance Covered Silent [Not covered]
Physical, speech, and Covered without limitations Limited to inpatient coverage.
related therapies other than medical necessity; "Maintenance therapy" expressly
no "recovery" requirements; excluded. Also excluded are
therapy covered for conditions "recreational and educational"
identified through early therapy and "any related diagnostic
intervention and child care testing except as provided by a
programs. hospital as part of a covered
inpatient basis." All services billed
by schools or a member of school
staffs are excluded.
Hearing services Covered without limitations, Testing covered only when "related
including tests, treatment, to illness or injury." Routine
hearing aids, and speech hearing tests excluded other than as
therapy related to hearing loss standard part of "routine" screening
and speech development, for children; hearing aids excluded
along with testing and
examinations for the prescribing or
fitting of hearing aids.
Eye examinations and Covered without limitations, as One pair of eyeglass replacement
eyeglasses medically necessary. lenses or contact lenses to "correct
an impairment directly caused by a
single instance of accidental ocular
injury or intraocular injury;" eye
examinations for specific medical
2006]
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BENEFIT MEDICAID EPSDT FEHBP STANDARD PPO
PROGRAM OPTION BLUE CROSS/BLUE
SHIELD PLAN
conditions; nonsurgical treatment
for amblyopia and strabismus from
birth through age 12. Eyeglasses
and routine eye examinations
specifically excluded, as are eye
exercises, visual training and
orthoptics except in connection
with the specific diagnosis of
amblyopia or strabismus.
Durable medical equipment Covered without limitations, as Certain DME covered but only if
(DME) medically necessary. prescribed for the treatment of
"illness or injury."
Home nursing Covered without limitations, as Covered for 2 hours per day, 25
medically necessary; home visits per year, when furnished by a
visits can cover health nurse or licensed practical nurse
educators, therapists, health and under a physician's orders.
aides, and others.
Other medically necessary Covered (and covered in No supplemental coverage
care greater amount, duration, and
scope) if recognized under
§1905a of the Social Security
Act
Medical necessity standard Early care to correct or BCBS determines "whether
ameliorate conditions services, drugs, supplies, or
equipment provided by a hospital
or other covered provider are:
1. Appropriate to prevent,
diagnose, or treat your condition,
illness, or injury;
2. Consistent with standards of
good medical practice in the United
States;
3. Not primarily for the personal
comfort or convenience of the
patient, the family, or the provider;
4. Not part of or associated with
training of the patient; and
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BENEFIT MEDICAID EPSDT FEHBP STANDARD PPO
PROGRAM OPTION BLUE CROSS/BLUE
SHIELD PLAN
5. In the case of inpatient care,
cannot be provided safely on an
outpatient basis. The fact that one
of our covered providers has
prescribed, recommended, or
approved a service or supply does
not, in itself, make it medically
necessary or covered under this
Plan."
Sources: § 1905(r) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396d(r); Part 5, Section 5122 of the
State Medicaid Manual; Office of Personnel Management, FEHBP Blue Cross and Blue Shield Service
Benefit Plan, 2005. Comparisons by George Washington University (author and Dr. Anne Markus).
Cost sharing and premiums
The DRA238 modifies federal law regarding the use of premiums and cost
sharing under Medicaid, amending the statute to provide states with considerable
flexibility to require beneficiaries to contribute toward coverage, particularly in the
case of persons with family incomes above the federal poverty level. The law
further permits states to redefine the meaning of poverty, in order to reclassify the
poor as near-poor.2 19 The flexibility to expand financial contribution requirements
for the near-poor was recommended by both the governors and the Medicaid
Commission, although neither recommended giving states the power to redefine
the meaning of poverty for premium and cost sharing purposes. In addition, the
law is silent with respect to cost sharing for the poor, leaving open to doubt
whether the distinction between poor and near-poor in fact has any meaning at all.
The DRA amendments continue certain prior cost sharing protections and add
several: children whose coverage is mandatory, pregnant women, certain elderly
and disabled persons, and persons with certain conditions. For affected
populations, however, the extent of permissible cost-sharing is quite significant.
The DRA recognizes the use of not only copayments, but also co-insurance, which
can amount to up to 20% of the cost of services in the case of non-exempt
individuals and families. 240 The DRA also permits states to expose the poor to cost
sharing requirements established for the near-poor by giving them the power to
238. DRA §§ 6041-43.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1916A(b)(3)(B) (as added by § 6043 of the DRA).
240. Id. § 1916A(b)(2).
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treat as available family income that is, by law, disregarded during the eligibility
determination phase. Because eligibility-related disregards tend to recognize
subsistence costs other than health care (e.g., work-related expenses, shelter), this
authority to treat post-eligibility income as available for health care expenditure
purposes has the potential to create significant new financial burdens especially
with respect to the use of premiums or the imposition of new cost sharing
responsibilities in the case of families with extensive health care needs.
The size of the potential cost sharing burden in out-years also rises under the
terms of the DRA. The amendments require the Secretary of HHS to annually
adjust cost-sharing levels to take into account the rate of medical inflation, 24' an
annual rate of increase far surpassing any possible annual increase in enrollee
income.242 Furthermore, although the legislation establishes certain aggregate
upper limits on families' total exposure to premiums and cost sharing in relation to
family income, this aggregated exposure level is steep: 5% of aggregate family
income on a quarterly or monthly basis. Thus, in the out-years the aggregate
burden also will rise steeply in relation to family income. Combined with state
power to redefine the poor as not poor, the potential impact of the premium and
cost sharing rules is truly significant.
Finally, the DRA gives states the option to permit providers (including
hospital emergency departments) to make premiums and cost-sharing requirements
"enforceable." Prior to the DRA, participating physicians and hospitals were
obligated to furnish care to patients regardless of their ability to satisfy applicable
cost sharing rules. The DRA permits states to allow participating providers to
require payment of any allowable cost sharing before providing care, including
payments for services sought in emergency departments, while also authorizing
providers to waive advance payment on a case-by-case basis. 243  How this
"enforceability" clause will be understood and administered in hospital emergency
department settings, given the prohibition against demanding payment for services
required under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Labor Act
(EMTALA),244 is unclear.
241. Id. § 1916A(d)(2)(b).
242. For an excellent illustration of medical costs compared to family income, see KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY,
Chart 1, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/sections/upload/7375.pdf. According to the
study, health insurance premium costs run annually at more than twice the general inflation rate and
worker premiums.
243. § 1916A(d)(2) of the Social Security Act.
244. 42 U.S.C. §1396dd(h) provides that "a participating hospital may not delay provision of an
appropriate medical screening examination . . . or further examination and treatment ... in order to
inquire about the individual's method of payment or insurance status."
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CONCLUSION
Medicaid's fortieth anniversary came in a year of significant program
alteration. How these changes are interpreted and applied in the context of state
program administration and judicial settings is a question that may require years to
answer. Taken together the reforms send certain strong messages about
government's evolving role in making health care for the poor financially
accessible, about the extent to which those who can least afford it will be shielded
from the dramatic reforms in coverage that are taking place within the private
insurance sector, and about the economic relationship between state and federal
governments. The new face of Medicaid is one in which the federal government
seeks actively to reduce its contribution levels to state programs in exchange for
greater state flexibility to trim help to the poor. From a broad perspective, the
DRA represents an about-face to four decades of federal Medicaid policy. In
effect, the message of the legislation is that the federal government will continue to
help states in their efforts to meet the cost of health care for their poorest residents,
but that this help will come at a high price for certain populations, health care
providers, and states interested in maintaining a broad program. The price to be
paid includes new standards that clamp down harshly on the classes of persons
entitled to receive help, states' ability to help the near-poor with at least moderate
coverage, and place pressure on states to cut benefits through the creation of
"flexibility options" that invite enthusiastic enactment by political and ideological
foes of extensive assistance to low income populations.
How the courts view Medicaid in the wake of the DRA is a matter to watch
carefully. With each passing year, the status of Medicaid coverage as a legally
enforceable federal right grows increasingly precarious. Structural legislative
changes as broad as those in the DRA lead one to envision, down the road, the
emergence of one of those magical "tipping points" when the law ceases to be one
thing and becomes another in the eyes of courts. In this case, the tipping point may
be the extent to which the DRA is considered to be a new vision for Medicaid, no
longer as a legally enforceable right to coverage akin to insurance, but as a vast
source of federal revenue sharing for states, with accompanying program and
expenditure obligations so broad as to eviscerate any notion of entitlement. This
tipping point finds its expression in the DRA's use of dramatic legislative language
to express the new state flexibility. One cannot imagine that in the ideologically
charged atmosphere of Washington D.C., this extravagant approach to expressing
states' option to change the meaning of coverage was the product of a simple error.
The question is whether the nation is ready for an additional 50 million uninsured
persons, who can join the ranks of the nearly 50 million today who hope for some
health care.
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